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2440th MEETING: 24 MAY 1983

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2440th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 24 May 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. M. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2440)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
   Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 11.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Maudave (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite Mr. Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kuwait, Mali, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Joseph (Australia), Mr. Wasiuddin (Bangladesh), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Sir Egerton Richardson (Jamaica), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Ozores Typaldos (Panama), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Sallu (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Afghanistan, Botswana, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Upper Volta in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance

with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Mrani Zentar (Morocco), Mr. Lobo (Mozambique), Mr. Otunnu (Uganda), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania) and Mr. Bassole (Upper Volta) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should also like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 20 May from the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which reads as follows:

> "On behalf of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, I have the honour to request, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to be invited to participate in the Council's consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia' ".

7. On previous occasions the Security Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, therefore, I propose that the Council extend an invitation pursuant to rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Raúl Roa Kourí, Acting Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

It was so decided.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members of the Council have before them document S/15784, containing the text of a letter dated 23 May from the representative of India addressed to the President of the Council.

9. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Mr. Isidoro Malmierca, whom I welcome. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

10. Mr. MALMIERCA (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, I should like, first of all, to express my thanks to you and to the other members of the Council for having given me the opportunity to make a statement during the Council's consideration of this important question. It is a pleasure, moreover, to do so under the presidency of a representative of an African country, who will undoubtedly guide the work of this organ effectively.

11. Yesterday, on the very day the Security Council began a series of meetings to consider once again the situation in southern Africa, the racist régime of Pretoria gave a further demonstration of its disdain for the most basic norms of international law by launching an air attack against Mozambique—against the worker population of Maputo—taking many lives and leaving dozens of wounded, including workers, women and children.

12. The seriousness of the situation in Namibia and in southern Africa in general, as well as the need to achieve a prompt resolution of it, arouses the deepest concern of the international community and has compelled the Council, with its commitment to international peace and security under the terms of the Charter of the United Nations, to meet once again in order to try to achieve what has thus far been impossible: the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978), considered to be the sole legal basis for the achievement of a negotiated, peaceful and just solution of the Namibian conflict.

13. The international community accepted resolution 435 (1978) in spite of everything, on the one hand convinced that the United Nations would veto any other measure and on the other hand seduced by the siren-songs which promised that this time—for the first and, perhaps, the only time in history—the intentions of the colonialists were honest.

14. Then the contact group of five Western countries appeared on the scene. Soon, however—sooner than might have been expected—the racist régime of Pretoria began to impose the most unconscionable conditions, in public and brazen alliance with Washington, which meant the failure of the group's efforts.

15. Since then, South Africa and the United States have opposed with subtle, tenacious and systematic resistance the United Nations plan for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), using devious tactics and manoeuvres of all types aimed at delaying the negotiating process and at prolonging indefinitely the illegal occupation of Namibia and the outrageous plunder of its natural wealth.

16. Washington and Pretoria imposed new, tougher conditions one after another until they arrived at the unacceptable idea of linking the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist forces, which are in Angola at the request of the Government of that country for the very purpose of defending its territory from the aggression of South Africa.

17. South Africa has for many years now refused to comply with the United Nations decisions on the independence of Namibia. Comrade Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, reminded us of his words before the Security Council in 1971 [*1588th meeting*]. When it was the colonialist troops of a member State of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that were in Angola, north of the Namibian border, South Africa also refused to withdraw from Namibia, although at that time it made no attempt to establish a link between Angola and the independence of Namibia.

18. Then, in 1975, when the colonialist troops withdrew from Angola, South Africa invaded the territory of independent Angola, and it was at that time that the Cuban internationalist fighters went to Angola to contribute to the defence of its independence and territorial integrity.

19. Since then, South Africa has committed constant acts of aggression against Angola and for almost two years it has occupied part of Angolan territory.

20. South Africa has no claim to anything; it must withdraw from Angola and it must withdraw from Namibia.

21. In recent days, various press sources have affirmed that it is the United States rather than South Africa that is insisting on linking the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola to the independence of Namibia. That position by a member of the contact group—supposedly established to facilitate negotiations, not to complicate them with new demands—also indicates designs that originate further away than Pretoria and are aimed at perpetuating the very profitable exploitation of the Namibian people and its territory.

22. In this connection, Cuba has always rejected the idea of linking the independence of Namibia to the presence of the Cuban internationalist forces in Angola. I should like to refer here to the first and ninth points of the Cuban-Angolan statement of 4 February 1982:

> "The presence and the withdrawal of the Cuban forces stationed in Angola constitutes a bilateral question between two sovereign States, the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
>
> "If the self-sacrificing struggle of SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the demands of the international community succeeded in bringing about a genuine solution to the problem of Namibia, based on strict compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and led to a truly independent Government and the total withdrawal of the South African occupying troops to the other side of the Orange River, thus considerably diminishing the danger of aggression against Angola, the Angolan and Cuban Governments would consider the resumption of the implementation of the programme for the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban forces within a time-frame to be agreed upon by both Governments."

23. How ironic it is that it is the self-proclaimed "champions of human rights" that are the firmest strategic ally of the Pretoria racists! How can they be allies of those who constantly violate the most basic human rights? What is *apartheid* if not the most brutal violation of human rights?

24. The strategic alliance between Reagan and Botha is only conceivable because they share the same interests. That strategic alliance has encouraged the Pretoria racists, who openly proclaim their right to attack and destabilize the States of southern Africa and refuse to free Namibia and to stop oppressing 20 million South Africans simply because they are black.

25. The Namibian people are certainly not prepared to stand by passively while others settle their future. The Angolan people are not prepared to allow their territory to be attacked and occupied by the Pretoria racists and their counter-revolutionary followers. The international community is not prepared to allow its laws to be violated with impunity. The gravity of the situation in Namibia and throughout southern Africa in general and its harmful consequences for world peace make that impossible.

26. Many resolutions, agreements, statements, measures and plans of action have been adopted by the international community within the framework of international bodies, but the United States imperialists and the South African racists have disregarded all of them.

27. The non-aligned countries, since the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961, have defended the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination and national independence in a united Namibia, including Walvis Bay, the Penguin Islands and the other offshore islands, in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and with their own agreements.

28. The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo in August 1976

> "congratulated the Government and people of Angola for their heroic and victorious struggle against the South African racist invaders and their allies, and commended the Republic of Cuba and other States which assisted the people of Angola in frustrating the expansionist and colonialist strategy of South Africa's racist régime and of its allies."[1]

29. That strategy, given new life today by the Pretoria racists, is inexorably doomed to failure.

30. At the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana in September 1979, the Heads of State or Government:

> "stated once again that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist régime of South Africa constitutes an aggression not only against the people of Namibia but also against all the independent and sovereign peoples and States of Africa and the world and represents a threat to international peace and security and open defiance of the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations on Namibia."[2]

31. Similarly, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting at New Delhi in March of this year,

> "most categorically rejected the linkage or parallelism being drawn by the United States Administration between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola", considering that "This continued insistence constitutes an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of Angola," and "strongly supported the position taken by the Front-Line States in this regard, as contained in the Lusaka communiqué of 20 February 1983" [*see S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 48.*]

32. We have strongly denounced the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of Namibia and declared that the plundering of those resources by transnational companies constitutes a grave violation of the Charter, and we have requested the colonialist exploiters to put an end to such activity, both in the continental Territory and in the islands and adjacent waters.

33. Our countries have pledged to give moral, material, financial, military, political, humanitarian and diplomatic support to SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, so that it may intensify its struggle on all fronts, especially the armed struggle, and we have set up a Solidarity Fund for Namibia and encouraged all the members of the Movement to make or increase contributions.

34. The non-aligned countries have likewise denounced the repression unleashed by the racist régime of South Africa against the SWAPO freedom fighters and have demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners in Namibia and that they be recognized as prisoners of war, under the provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949[3] and the Additional Protocol thereto.[4]

35. The General Assembly, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence held in Paris in April and a series of international, regional, governmental, non-governmental and other organizations demonstrating solidarity on this issue have spoken out in similar terms. This is a unanimous and universal demand for rejection of the so-called linkage or parallelism which it has been sought to establish, for the liberation of Namibia and for peace in the southern part of the African continent.

36. Hence the appeal by the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, at their Seventh Conference, to the Security Council to meet, as soon as possible, in order to consider further action on the implementation of its plan for the independence of Namibia, thereby assuming its primary responsibility for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). [*Ibid., para. 49.*]

37. Cuba, faithful to its principles and as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, is fulfilling the agreements adopted at the New Delhi summit in speaking out here.

38. We sincerely believe that the crucial time has come for the Namibian people. Either the Council must fulfil its duties *vis-à-vis* Namibia or the Namibian people will continue and intensify the armed struggle, so greatly feared by the imperialist countries, convinced as the Namibian people are that their victory is certain. That is not a threat but rather an ineluctable and irreversible law of the history of mankind.

39. If we really want to help the Namibian people, the front-line States and the South African people who are being subjected to the most abominable policy of racial discrimination, if we want to make a contribution to international peace and security, the Council must fully assume its responsibility for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

40. The Council must set a deadline for the implementation of the new measures to be adopted to implement that resolution.

41. If the fascist arrogance of the United States Administration and the racist intransigence of the South African régime persist in preventing a solution to the conflict, then Chapter VII of the Charter provides for the necessary sanctions to compel the racist transgressor to implement the decisions of the Council, which reflect the demand of all peoples.

42. The United States may time and again veto attempts to resolve the Namibian problem, it may engage in all sorts of manoeuvres, but what it will not be able to do is prevent the triumph of the Namibian people sooner or later.

43. May this series of meetings of the Council not become just one more to study the question of Namibia and the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Let us heed the demands of the peoples, who anxiously wait for us to fulfil our duty, by contributing to freeing the Namibian people from their bloody and cruel Calvary and by tying the hands of the Pretoria racists, who in their madness are attempting to drag the people of southern Africa into their new order of plunder and extermination.

44. We have, at this series of meetings of the Council, heard praise of South Africa; we have even heard talk of nut trees [*2439th meeting, para. 64*]; but we cannot close our ears to the appeal of the people of Namibia, to the demands of those who are fighting for the most precious of possessions—freedom—or to those who are taking up the weapons of those who have fallen in the battle and are fighting so that there may be no more victims of *apartheid* either in Namibia or in southern Angola.

45. Cuba hopes that the Council will fulfil its historic duty by contributing to the rapid and unconditional independence of Namibia, thereby making an inestimable contribution to peace.

46. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zam-

bia, Mr. Goma, whom I welcome. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

47. Mr. GOMA (Zambia): Mr. President, on behalf of the Zambian delegation, I wish to thank you and the other members of the Council for giving us the opportunity to participate in this important debate on the question of Namibia. May the Council, under your able guidance, make real and significant progress on this matter so that the freedom and independence of Namibia can be secured without further delay.

48. This series of Council meetings on Namibia has been convened in response to a virtually universal demand. For quite some time now, there has been a strong international demand for action by the Council to ensure the early implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) on the independence of Namibia. The world community is exasperated, anxious and concerned over the delay in implementing this resolution, which provides a solid basis for a peaceful negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem. It wants movement and not continued stagnation on this issue. It wants Namibia to be free and independent now and the sad chapter of the outrageous illegal occupation of that Territory by South Africa to be brought to a close.

49. This position of the international community has been eloquently articulated at three recent major international conferences, namely, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March, the International Conference in Support of the Front-line States, held at Lisbon, also in March, and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April. All these conferences requested that the Council meet on Namibia in order that it might reassert itself and properly assume its full responsibilities for the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978). The Secretary-General, in his report to the Council [*S/15776*], also expressed his deep concern at the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978).

50. Our main objective at this meeting is thus clear: we want to find ways and means of securing the immediate and unimpeded implementation of resolution 435 (1978), in letter and in spirit. We are not seeking a confrontation with any country or group of countries that, like ourselves, genuinely want to see Namibia free and independent quickly, and we hope that there will be none. We are here not to embarrass anybody but to state the facts as we know them and to press for real progress in the efforts for the liberation and genuine independence of Namibia.

51. Resolution 435 (1978) was adopted by the Council some five years ago. It was intended to be the basis for Namibia's independence within a period of one year. The Namibian people should thus have been celebrating this year the fourth anniversary of its independence.

52. The adoption of resolution 435 (1978) was significant not least for the fact that it was inspired, negotiated and pressed before the Council by five prominent Western countries with close political, economic and strategic relations with South Africa. These countries have come to be known as the Western contact group on Namibia. The international community had repeatedly called upon these countries to use their considerable leverage on South Africa to bring about the independence of Namibia. Their initiative in respect of resolution 435 (1978) was therefore interpreted as a response to the numerous demands of the international community and a demonstration of their willingness and readiness, at long last, to take meaningful and practical action, within the framework of the United Nations, to compel South Africa to end its illegal occupation of and stranglehold on Namibia.

53. We in Zambia welcomed this apparent change of heart on the part of the most important allies of South Africa. Together with the other front-line States, Nigeria and SWAPO, we agreed to co-operate with them in order to ensure the success of their initiative. The record of our co-operation and constructive attitude is there for everyone to see; it speaks for itself. We did not despair or give up even in the face of the most arrogant, provocative and savage attitude of and actions by South Africa. Instead, we persevered right up to the round of talks involving senior officials of the contact group, on the one hand, and those of the front-line States, Nigeria and SWAPO, on the other, which took place here in New York in July and August 1982, with the objective of accelerating the process of implementing resolution 435 (1978). The impression we had at that time was not only that the discussions were constructive, but also that significant progress had been made. As a consequence, the parties to the talks held further discussions with the Secretariat with regard to the size, composition and deployment of the military component of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). The only major issue which remained unsettled was that of the electoral system which was to be used in the United Nations—supervised Namibian elections. We were, however, informed that this too would be made known soon. But what has been the outcome?

54. There is at present an impasse in the efforts to secure Namibia's independence. This impasse has been caused by the injection by the United States of a linkage between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. We cannot but view with grave concern and dismay the injection of this linkage issue just at a time when the parties to the conflict had resolved major misunderstandings and optimism concerning a settlement was at its highest. It is this linkage which has blocked progress in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), thus thwarting the United Nations mandate and the aspirations of the Namibian people. It is ironic that a member of the contact group is responsible for the present impasse. Rather than press for progress in the implementation of its own resolution, it has introduced an extraneous issue which has had the very opposite effect.

55. The South African régime is a master of prevarication, procrastination and intransigence with regard to the question of the freedom and independence of Namibia. Time and again it has pretended to be interested in a negotiated settlement, only to use the negotiations to buy time. Not unexpectedly, therefore, it has capitalized on the linkage issue. Thus, the linkage issue has provided the régime with yet another pretext for continuing its illegal occupation of Namibia and thereby perpetuating the oppression and repression of the innocent Namibian people and the plunder of their natural resources.

56. We in Zambia, the rest of the front-line States, other African States, the non-aligned countries and other progressive countries and forces have categorically rejected the claimed linkage between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola because the issue is extraneous to and can only have a diversionary impact on the Namibian question. We also reject it because it introduces an ideological element into what is plainly a decolonization question.

57. The question of Namibia is not about ideology. It is not about an independent Namibia being close to or falling under the sphere of influence of one or the other super-Power. The Namibian people are simply fighting for their freedom and independence and not to become communist or capitalist. Their struggle is legitimate and in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. It is most outrageous to distort the purpose and meaning of this struggle and to perceive and project it in an ideological context. Namibia and its people should not become a pawn in the super-Power rivalries for spheres of influence.

58. It is necessary to underscore the gravity of the present lack of progress on the Namibian question. The continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa is one of the principal elements in that régime's total strategy, which it is pursuing in defence of *apartheid*. This entails, with respect to Namibia, procrastination and prevarication in regard to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978); continued bloodshed as men, women and children are killed, maimed or seriously injured in the armed conflict; continued savage oppression and repression of the Namibian people as evidenced by the innumerable Namibian patriots who are continually subjected to harassment, arrest, imprisonment and torture by the illegal occupying authorities in a vain attempt to stifle their resolve to be free and independent. In addition, vast numbers of Namibians are victims of homelessness, as they are obliged to flee their country to live as exiles or refugees elsewhere.

59. This is not all. The continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa also has an external dimension. The Pretoria régime repeatedly commits wanton acts of aggression and destabilization against independent African States in southern Africa from Namibian territory, in the false hope of frustrating the support, based on principle, that these States give to the oppressed peoples of Namibia and South Africa in their liberation struggles.

60. Angola and my own country, Zambia, which do not share a common border with South Africa, have been and are victims of the South African régime's acts of aggression launched from Namibia. In this manner, South African military forces occupied parts of Angolan territory in the south and have remained there up to now in spite of a world-wide demand for their withdrawal. South Africa's acts of aggression against other independent States in the region are a direct breach of international peace and, thus, a violation of the Charter.

61. In order to appease its supporters in the West and the principal shareholders and profit-makers in Namibia and South Africa, who all come from the West, the South African régime continues to create a false alarm about a so-called communist onslaught in southern Africa and that a SWAPO Government in a free and independent Namibia would be a Soviet puppet. Regrettably, some have been duped by this propaganda or have taken advantage of it for their own global or domestic purposes.

62. Related to the actions designed to ensure South Africa's continued stranglehold on Namibia is the incidence of plunder and exploitation of the Territory's rich natural resources. There would appear to be a conscious decision by South Africa, in collusion with powerful Western economic enterprises, to deplete the rich natural resources of Namibia before conceding its independence.

63. When all those circumstances are considered, we are left with no other conclusion than that there is no intention whatsoever on the part of South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and to see that Territory become free and independent soon. Can the international community stand by and simply watch the South African régime defiantly thwarting the United Nations mandate, blocking the freedom and independence of Namibia, continuing to kill, maim and torture the innocent Namibian people, wantonly committing gross violations of human rights and arrogantly degrading fellow human beings on grounds of colour and race in a Territory for which the United Nations has direct responsibility until independence and, with impunity, committing international crimes by engaging in acts of aggression and destabilizing front-line and other independent African States in the region and thereby seriously endangering international peace and security? This is an intolerable situation and it must be brought to an end quickly.

64. This series of meetings of the Council is taking place against the sombre background of a criminal South African attack against Mozambique in which innocent civilians have been killed and valuable property wantonly destroyed. Zambia most strongly condemns this South African aggression against Mozambique. South Africa cannot and will not solve its internal problems by committing acts of aggression against neighbouring African States. The oppressed peoples of South Africa are struggling and will continue to struggle within South Africa itself until the abominable system of *apartheid* and minority rule is eliminated. We therefore say the follow-

ing to the South African régime: "End your system of *apartheid* and minority rule and your problems will be over."

65. At this juncture, I should like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for his lucid report to the Council concerning the question of Namibia. We also commend him for his efforts in the quest to bring early independence to Namibia. His report agrees with the aforementioned thesis in the following words:

> "It is evident that the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978) is having a destructive impact not only on Namibia itself but also on the prospect of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole. The delay also has an adverse effect on international relations in a wider sphere, adding to the prevailing sense of frustration and mistrust, with all that that implies for peace and security in the region." [*Ibid., para. 16.*]

66. There is therefore an urgent need to break the current stalemate over Namibia which has been brought about by the linkage issue. It cannot be over-emphasized that resolution 435 (1978) provides a valid and adequate basis for a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Namibian problem. We call upon the Council to recommit itself to resolution 435 (1978) and to take decisive action aimed at the speedy and scrupulous implementation of that resolution. We further call upon all States to strive for its immediate implementation in letter and in spirit. It is also important that the central role of the United Nations to ensure that Namibia attains its freedom and genuine independence should not be undermined under any pretext. Accordingly, it is essential that the hand of the Secretary-General be strengthened so that he can move expeditiously and effectively with regard to the process for implementing the resolution. We appeal to all States to give him their full co-operation.

67. As I said at the beginning of my statement, we have not come here to provoke any confrontation with any country or group of countries. We are not here to make any exaggerated demands on the Council and its members. We have come to have the Namibian question placed in its proper perspective and to generate a momentum for real progress in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). It is therefore our hope that, at the end of the day, this will have proved to be a fruitful Council meeting characterized by a constructive spirit, realism and great courage to take those steps that can and will truly advance the freedom and genuine independence of Namibia.

68. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of South Africa. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

69. Mr. von SCHIRNDING (South Africa): I should like to join preceding speakers in congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the office of President of the Council and to express our confidence that you will conduct these proceedings with due impartiality.

70. The purpose of this series of meetings is not the promotion of a peaceful settlement of the question of South West Africa. On the contrary, its main objective is to undermine the delicate negotiations that are currently under way.

71. The time has come to remind the United Nations that South Africa has never accepted the United Nations view that South Africa's presence in the Territory is illegal, nor has the International Court of Justice ever delivered a binding judgement to the effect that South Africa's right to administer the Territory has been terminated. As far as South Africa is concerned, it continues to administer the Territory legally and in conformity with the spirit of the lapsed Mandate from the League of Nations. However, as a purely practical political consideration, in the search for an internationally acceptable settlement South Africa agreed with the proposition put to it by the contact group in March 1978 that all sides, including the United Nations, should "set on one side the long-standing legal disputes that have bedevilled consideration of this question for 30 years". It would seem that the United Nations, by its spurious claims, wishes to revert to the legal arguments that characterized the first 30 years of this dispute.

72. During the past five years, South Africa has persistently continued the search for an internationally acceptable settlement. It was South Africa which, on 25 April 1978, first accepted the Western proposal, some months before the equivocal response of SWAPO, which contained conditions that almost wrecked the settlement initiative at its very commencement.

73. It was South Africa which, on 22 December 1978, after having first consulted with the elected representatives of the people of the Territory, informed the Secretary-General of its decision "to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)". [*S/12983, annex I.*]

74. It was South Africa which, on 6 February 1979, advised the Secretary-General that early implementation was imperative, and which urged the United Nations that the emplacement of UNTAG, even if it only involved certain advance units, should commence not later than the end of February 1979.

75. It was not South Africa which created the obstacles that have, since February 1979, frustrated agreement on a peaceful settlement.

76. It was not South Africa which brazenly altered the independence proposal on 26 February 1979 to remove basic guarantees for the security of the people of South West Africa. It was officials of the Secretariat who did this, at the insistence of SWAPO and with the connivance of representatives of certain countries. My Government has in its possession the documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. It will be recalled that, on 21 February 1979, telegraphic clarifications were despatched from the Secretary-General's office to a number

of Governments which conflicted directly with the express understandings that had previously been reached between South Africa and the contact group. In terms of these clarifications, SWAPO would be given bases inside South West Africa which it had never had, and the military component of UNTAG would no longer be required to monitor the restriction of SWAPO to bases outside South West Africa. Apparently SWAPO now accepts restriction as to base and monitoring by UNTAG, but in February 1979 its refusal to do so directly impeded the negotiations and led to an impasse of long duration.

77. It was not South Africa which created well-founded doubts in the minds of the people of the Territory concerning the United Nations bias in favour of SWAPO. It was the United Nations itself, through the massive material, political and propaganda assistance it extended—and indeed continues to extend—to SWAPO. Indeed, this series of meetings of the Council is a cynical demonstration of United Nations bias in favour of SWAPO. However, I should like to add that the more constructive tone reflected in the Secretary-General's report [*S/15776*] has not gone unnoticed.

78. I should also like at this stage to register my appreciation for the reference yesterday [*2439th meeting*] by the representative of the United Kingdom to South Africa's positive role in the negotiations leading to the independence of Zimbabwe.

79. It was not South Africa which aroused fears that the people of South West Africa would be subjected to intimidation during the election campaign. It was SWAPO which did so through its cold-blooded campaign of terrorism, which has left more than 1,300 civilians dead and at least 25 prominent local politicians assassinated. SWAPO has added to these apprehensions with statements which it has made over the Voice of Namibia in which it has declared that "the liquidation of traitors may have to be intensified if the revolution is to succeed". In addition, the instructions issued to terrorists who recently attempted to infiltrate into the Territory included orders to kill members of the civilian population indiscriminately, to kill political leaders opposed to SWAPO and to lay landmines as widely as possible.

80. It was not South Africa which created the deepest misgivings among the people of South West Africa concerning the continuation of fundamental constitutional rights after independence. It was SWAPO with its terrorist practices and Marxist principles and threats to discipline political opponents that has done so. As Mr. Nujoma has said in recent years:

> "We do not fight for majority rule, we fight in order to take over the power in Namibia for the benefit of the people of Namibia. We are revolutionaries.
>
> "We believe that a really socialistic State in Namibia can only be enforced by means of violent revolution.
>
> "Cuba is the example for revolution. The Cuban revolution is our revolution. It is the revolution of suppressed people."

81. In the mean time, another threat to the stability and the process of self-determination in South West Africa—and indeed throughout southern Africa—is casting its ominous shadow across our subcontinent, yet another peril for the peace of southern Africa, which is growing with each passing month and which has not been of South Africa's making. I refer to the increasing and threatening presence of the surrogate forces of an expansionist and imperial super-Power in our region. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa recently stated in the South African Parliament:

> "There is an unquestionable *de facto* linkage between the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the settlement of the South West African question. It is ludicrous to suggest that the introduction of the hostile and expansionist surrogates of a super-Power into the southern African region will not have the most far-reaching implications for the security of all of the countries of the region, particularly when one considers:
>
> "(1) The doctrine of the super-Power, the Soviet Union, which openly proclaims the necessity for the world-wide exportation of communism;
>
> "(2) The record of the surrogate, Cuba, for subversion and the fomentation of revolution in Central America, South America and Africa;
>
> "(3) The threat which Soviet- and Cuban-supported elements have already posed to a country in the region, that is, the Shaba invasion of Zaire."

82. It was these concerns which ultimately led to the impasse at the Geneva pre-implementation meeting in January 1981 and which for some time left the whole settlement concept dead in the water.

83. It was against this background that the United States Government approached the South African Government in the early part of 1981 to learn whether the South African Government would be prepared to participate in a new initiative in search of a settlement based on resolution 435 (1978). It will be recalled that the United States proposed a phased initiative in an attempt to address these concerns and to dismantle the obstacles. There is a widespread misapprehension in the international community that there has been some form of collusion between South Africa and the United States over South West Africa. Nothing could be further from the truth. It was only with considerable apprehension that South Africa agreed to certain proposals which were put to it by the current United States Administration. However, despite its deep-seated misgivings, it agreed to adopt a flexible approach with a view to finding peaceful solutions to the problems of South West Africa and southern Africa.

84. On 26 January 1982, South Africa informed the contact group that it had accepted the revised constitutional principles which the five had presented to it on 17 December 1981. On two subsequent occasions, in an attempt to expedite the independence process, South Africa agreed to amendments to the proposed electoral system which other parties had demanded. Nevertheless,

owing to SWAPO intransigence, it was not until 12 July 1982 that the contact group was able to report to the Secretary-General that all parties had accepted the principles. [*See S/15287.*]

85. There should be no mistake concerning the seriousness of South Africa's attitude to these negotiations. South Africa does not regard the proposals which have been made and the undertakings which have been given as so many pieces of paper to be blown away willy-nilly by SWAPO and the international community when they have served their propaganda purpose.

86. As a result of its bitter experiences in the past, South Africa has developed a deeply sceptical attitude towards the United Nations in its dealings with the international community over South West Africa. South Africa will, accordingly, not be content with words and paper undertakings. It is seeking firm and concrete signs that the United Nations is prepared to give serious attention to the justifiable concerns of the people of South West Africa and to the legitimate interests of South Africa in a stable and peaceful southern Africa.

87. How can we reconcile the supposed commitment of SWAPO to the constitutional principles with its totalitarian rantings at the recent Paris Conference and, what is more, with the expulsion of a representative of one of the South West Africa political parties from that Conference?

88. How can we reconcile the search for peace implicit in these negotiations with the unilateral escalation by SWAPO of its terrorist attacks against the people of the Territory? Only last February, SWAPO launched its largest-ever offensive against the people of the Territory, despite the fact that intensive efforts were at that very time under way to try to bring peace to the region. The SWAPO attack, which failed in all its objectives, involved 600 to 850 specially trained terrorists, divided into 12 to 14 groups. Despite the failure of its last initiative, SWAPO is even now in the process of mustering its forces for yet another desperate attack against the civilian population of the Territory.

89. How can we reconcile the requirement of impartiality with the continuing United Nations activities in support of SWAPO as most recently manifested at the Paris Conference?

90. South Africa has also attempted to play a constructive role in removing the last major obstacle to the realization of a peaceful settlement: that is, the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. South Africa felt that it could make a positive contribution in this regard by attempting to establish peace in the border area between South West Africa and Angola.

91. Members of the Council will recall that representatives of South Africa and Angola met at ministerial level in the Cape Verde Islands on 7 and 8 December 1982, and during that meeting South Africa made certain practical proposals for the establishment of peace in the border area. A second round of talks, also at ministerial level, was arranged for 23 February 1983, but a week before the discussions were due to take place, SWAPO launched its largest-ever offensive against South West Africa, with the knowledge and support of the Angolan Government. South Africa nevertheless decided to send a delegation to the Cape Verde Islands, led by the South African Director-General for Foreign Affairs and Information, to make it clear to Angola that it and SWAPO would have to reciprocate the military restraint which had been manifested by South Africa if there was to be any progress with the peace initiative.

92. The South African delegation also emphasized that a lasting settlement would require the withdrawal of Cuban forces. Within this context, South Africa is prepared to hold further talks with Angola. Indeed, South Africa is still awaiting Angola's reaction to a recent letter in which this position was set out.

93. Much has been said of South Africa's armed forces along the borders of South West Africa. Once again, the situation which has arisen has not been of South Africa's making. We would much prefer peaceful coexistence with all our neighbours. We have repeatedly invited our neighbours to enter into non-aggression pacts and we have suggested that they discuss with us matters of mutual concern.

94. As the Council is no doubt aware, the Governments of Mozambique and South Africa agreed to follow up bilateral ministerial talks which had taken place on 17 December 1982 with a second round of ministerial discussions on 5 May 1983. However, the Government of Mozambique deemed it fit to send a propaganda story into the world a few days prior to the scheduled meeting to the effect that the South African Government had trained and instructed a South African citizen by the name of Petrus Benjamin Schoeman, *inter alia*, to assassinate the President of Mozambique. It must be assumed that this story was intended to give substance to allegations which the Council has already heard this morning, that South Africa was destabilizing its neighbours in southern Africa.

95. When confronted by the South African Government's determination not to continue with bilateral discussions before the facts regarding Mr. Schoeman had been established, the Mozambique delegation agreed to a team of South African policemen proceeding to Maputo to obtain Mr. Schoeman's fingerprints. These fingerprints established beyond any doubt whatsoever that the person held by the Mozambican authorities had a criminal record spanning a period from 22 March 1961, when he was 14 years of age, to 5 January 1976, when he was declared a habitual criminal. Mr. Schoeman was released on parole by the South African authorities on 20 January 1982, but he broke his parole conditions soon after his release and has subsequently been sought by the South African police in this connection as well as in connection with allegations of theft allegedly committed after his release.

96. By their own admission, the Mozambique authorities had detained Mr. Schoeman in custody for more than a year, since approximately the time when he was being sought by the South African police. It is clear that Mr. Schoeman could have been paraded before the international press at any time over a period of more than a year, and it is equally clear that Mr. Schoeman is one of life's unfortunate cases in urgent need of sympathetic and human care.

97. But despite the irrefutable evidence that Schoeman is nothing more than a common criminal and despite Maputo's unambiguous acknowledgement of this fact, the Government of Mozambique nevertheless had the gall to use him in yet another of its propaganda set-pieces, this time by displaying him in its capital, as recently as last Saturday, before a crowd of 50,000 people as a "member of the Mozambique National Resistance". This charade has exposed to the world community the lengths to which certain elements will go to smear South Africa with the label of destabilization.

98. However, an attitude has developed in the international community, largely as a result of the perverse positions adopted by the Organization, that South Africa and those who are under its legitimate protection may be attacked across international borders with impunity. Let there be no mistake about South Africa's reaction. We shall defend ourselves and the people of South West Africa with all the means at our disposal. Those who harbour terrorists, those who attempt to destabilize our society, must understand that South Africa will not take this lying down. We would not have it so, but the choice is theirs.

99. From the foregoing it should be clear that the obstacles to an international settlement of the South West Africa question have not been of South Africa's making. On the contrary, South Africa has consistently worked for the creation of circumstances which will permit the people of South West Africa to determine their own future in conditions of impartiality, secure from terrorist and other forms of intimidation, confident of the continuation of their basic constitutional and civil rights, and assured that their country will not fall prey to the predatory expansion of the Soviet Union and its surrogates. South Africa has no intention of deviating from this course.

100. The recent terrorist outrage in Pretoria and South Africa's subsequent retaliation against African National Congress of South Africa targets in Mozambique graphically illustrate the urgency of the choice which must be made in southern Africa between the dangers of escalating confrontation and the benefits of peace and co-operation. As the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs stated in Parliament on 17 September 1981:

> "We therefore all have a dilemma, the rest of Africa and South Africa, and the time is approaching that we must face the facts as they are, without demanding confessions. Southern Africa is not a house of confession. What is required is a realistic appraisal of the dilemmas in which we find ourselves. If we fail to do this, the drift towards confrontation and conflagration in southern Africa will become inevitable. Invective and acrimonious exchanges and eventually hatred, suspicion and mistrust will accumulate and will become a driving force towards a situation of general war in southern Africa, and no winner will emerge from such a conflict situation."
>
> "That is why to my mind the choice is quite clear. It is imminent. South West Africa is only a part of the southern Africa scene. It is, as far as I am concerned, the tip of the iceberg. The bulk is underneath and much more dangerous. I believe the Angolans, the Zambians, the people of Zimbabwe and the people of Mozambique are tired of the turbulence of our region. If that is the case, then I believe that there rests an historic responsibility on all the leaders of southern Africa to get together and objectively and constructively review the whole situation in southern Africa. I believe the time for this is ripe."

101. Now that choice still exists. I trust and hope that the Security Council will not consider any action or set any deadlines which might force southern Africa in the direction of confrontation and of an escalation of conflict. The Council should be under no illusions as to who would suffer most. It would not be the super-Powers or the United Nations which would have to pay the price for unleashing the dogs of war upon our region. It would be all the peoples of southern Africa, of all the countries of our region.

102. But the world must also understand that the South African Government will not bow to threats. We shall not be bound by deadlines or held hostage by intimidation. We shall make our own decisions according to our perception of our responsibilities and interests and this means that in our international dealings we shall continue to deal fairly with all nations in a spirit of good-neighbourliness and respect for the rights of all peoples to self-determination. We shall continue to make our essential contribution to international commerce. We shall meet our obligations and we shall pay our debts. Where we can, we shall continue to help our neighbours who commit themselves to peaceful coexistence and constructive co-operation. Inside our country we shall continue to maintain order and stability and we shall carry on with the process of controlled reform. We believe that there are more than enough moderate people and people of good will within our country, within South West Africa and within our region to assure us all of peace and prosperity.

103. But at the same time we shall continue to resist radical alien and malevolent interference in our affairs. We shall not permit surrogate forces to influence developments in our region and we shall not tolerate the expansion of Soviet imperialism on our borders. We have lost patience with those in the international community who incessantly work for our destruction, who call for our isolation and incite terrorist violence against us and who then throw up their hands in amazement and

horror when we have the temerity to defend ourselves. We shall continue to work for peace, prosperity and self-determination in our own country and in South West Africa. But let there be no doubt: those who threaten us increase the chances of confrontation and conflict throughout our region and those who attack us, or who assist others to attack us, do so at their most dire peril.

104. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Kenya. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

105. Mr. WABUGE (Kenya): I wish to take this opportunity to convey greetings and best wishes to all the members of the Council from Mr. Daniel arap Moi, President of the Republic of Kenya and current Chairman of the OAU. It is his hope that the Council will with firmness take the necessary steps to ensure that its resolution 435 (1978) is fully implemented.

106. At this juncture permit me to express Kenya's gratitude to the Council for agreeing to extend an invitation to my country to address the Council on such an important issue as the one under discussion.

107. I am happy to be addressing the Council at a time when you are presiding over its deliberations, particularly since the issue under consideration is of capital importance to Africa, a region of which your country is an eminent member. I am confident that your distinguished career as a diplomat and statesman and your wealth of experience in tackling difficult issues will greatly assist the work of the Council in making realistic and genuine progress towards the final solution of the problem of the total decolonization of Namibia. Allow me also to express Kenya's thanks to the other members of the Council for their great devotion and dedication in discharging the enormous responsibilities in connection with Namibia's independence entrusted to them by the international community.

108. The Council has been convened at the request of the non-aligned countries. When the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries met at New Delhi in March this year, it called upon the Security Council to meet as soon as possible in order to consider further action on the implementation of the plan for Namibia's independence. It made that call because it believed that the situation in Namibia had reached a critical stage and that the international community must discharge its obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to ensure the implementation of the Council resolution on Namibia, which has been too long delayed.

109. In the 37 years of United Nations history, voluminous records have accumulated of continued aggression by South Africa against the people of Namibia and the neighbouring countries. The United Nations also has voluminous records of its resolutions, decisions and recommendations on the decolonization of Namibia. It is not our intention in this debate to dwell on the history of South Africa's aggression in southern Africa. The records of that aggression speak for themselves and we do not need to labour the point. Even friends of South Africa agree with us on this sad history of the racist régime. We have come here with one main objective—the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) on the independence of Namibia.

110. It is now five years since the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia was endorsed by the Council in resolution 435 (1978). At the time, we hoped that South Africa had regained its senses and was ready to co-operate in arranging for the peaceful transition to independence of Namibia. Instead of moving towards the implementation of the United Nations plan, South Africa has intensified its war against the liberation forces, the forces of SWAPO and the neighbouring States, particularly Angola and Mozambique. Instead of implementing the United Nations plan, South Africa has moved in to convert Namibia into an armed camp, a military base and a springboard from which it has carried out unprovoked attacks against neighbouring countries.

111. The events of yesterday are a vivid example of what we have been saying over the years. The air attack carried out in the early hours of yesterday morning against Mozambique clearly shows how the racist régime is responding to the international demand for its withdrawal from Namibia. The air raids against Mozambique stand condemned by the entire world community. Such acts of aggression will only harden the resolve and the determination of the freedom fighters to continue the armed struggle. Indeed, Africa and the entire world community are bound to ask what it is that South Africa wants.

112. As I have said, we have come before the Council with one main objective: the implementation of the United Nations plan as called for in its resolution 435 (1978). We have all agreed that this plan remains the only basis for peaceful transition to independence by Namibia. Since the adoption of the plan in 1978, Africa and, indeed, the rest of the world have waited with anxious impatience for the implementation of the plan. We were told by those close to South Africa and by those who had offered themselves as negotiators for that country that it was ready to accept the implementation of the United Nations plan.

113. For our part, we had no illusions about South Africa's sincerity in all these negotiations. The African States, together with SWAPO, had serious doubts regarding South Africa's sincerity in these negotiations. Our fears and apprehensions were proved right only last summer when we thought that the contact group had prevailed upon South Africa to accept the plan. Last summer, our hopes were raised and there were great expectations that at last the plan would be set in motion. We were told by those negotiating for South Africa, namely, the contact group, that finally an agreement had

been reached to begin the implementation of the United Nations plan. We were not surprised at all when, soon after the so-called negotiations with South Africa, we began to get signals of something different from what we had been given to understand by the contact group. It became clear that, as before, South Africa was playing its usual game of delaying tactics. Instead of implementing the plan, South Africa is now making an unrealistic, unrelated and unacceptable demand of an independent neighbouring State, Angola.

114. It is very pertinent at this time to say that Africa welcomed the initiatives of the contact group in our negotiations with South Africa. We, however, should like to stress the point that those who have assumed the responsibility for negotiating with South Africa and have received co-operation and support from SWAPO should do so genuinely and stop sending confusing and conflicting signals to South Africa.

115. We are discussing the implementation of the United Nations plan according to resolution 435 (1978). this plan needs no other modifications or conditions on the part of any other State. We therefore cannot and will not accept any notion of linking the implementation of this plan with the internal affairs of Angola. Namibians are fighting for self-determination, to liberate their own country. Angolans are fighting to preserve their own territorial integrity and sovereignty against the brutal aggression by South Africa. We must concede to the Angolans the right to seek help whenever they feel they need it. In fact, it is our view that when Namibia becomes independent, the threat to Angola's sovereignty coming from South Africa will be removed. We therefore urge the contact group, particularly those of its members with power and influence over South Africa, not to encourage it to erect unrelated and unjustifiable obstacles to the implementation of the plan. Let it be understood by South Africa and the contact group that at the time resolution 435 (1978) was debated and adopted and during the subsequent negotiations under United Nations auspices, Angola, as a sovereign State, had welcomed Cuban troops and no one at that time raised the question of linkage. Let the contact group, if it is serious and honest about the implementation of the plan, drop the idea in order to enable the Secretary-General to implement resolution 435 (1978).

116. We have come here today before the Council to urge the international community to renew our mandate to the Secretary-General for the speedy implementation of the long-overdue plan for the independence of Namibia. In our view, the time has come for the United Nations to act decisively; the time is now. In all our deliberations for the liberation of Namibia, we have been patient. We have been flexible enough. We have been reasonable. We have made significant concessions in order to accommodate South Africa. And what has South Africa done in return for all these genuine gestures? It has taken advantage of our patience and moderation by escalating the conflict. It is, therefore, not difficult to see the cause of our frustration and the reasons for our impatience.

117. The international community must continue its onerous responsibility for Namibia. It is precisely for this reason that we are meeting here to request the Security Council to renew—not to change or modify—its mandate to the Secretary-General and to proceed with the task of implementing resolution 435 (1978) and the plan approved therein. We feel compelled to demand at this meeting that a draft resolution be adopted by the Council in which the Secretary-General will be requested to submit his report on the progress of the implementation plan before the opening of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. We make this demand in view of the fact that the problem of Namibia has been stalemated since 1978. It is our belief that the Council should now move to implement its own resolution, a move which is much overdue. Our special appeal goes to those States which have the power and the means to influence South Africa to assist us and the Secretary-General in this exercise of implementation without complicating an already complex problem.

118. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The last speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Mr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. I welcome him and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

119. Mr. KUSUMAATMADJA (Indonesia): I should like to express my sincere appreciation to you, Sir, and to the members of the Council for giving me the opportunity to participate in the present deliberations on the question of Namibia. In congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month, I should also like to assure you of my delegation's high regard for your qualities of statesmanship and diplomatic skill, which will certainly be indispensable to the success of our common efforts. Indeed, it is most fitting that an eminent son of Africa is presiding over this important series of meetings, the outcome of which will no doubt decisively affect the course of future events in the long-troubled region of southern Africa.

120. This series of meetings of the Council were called to consider an issue of crucial importance, an issue which has long been a major preoccupation of the Organization and especially of the Council.

121. Over the past 35 years, the international community has been addressing itself to the cause of self-determination and independence of the Namibian people. Throughout those years, it has pronounced itself on this question in no uncertain terms and always in the hope that legitimacy will supersede illegality, that collective efforts will replace unilateral actions and that international law will prevail over arbitrary rule. It would seem redundant to recall the multitude of resolutions passed by the General Assembly and this very Council, the various advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the decisions of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the actions of other authoritative international forums, such as the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the OAU. In addition to these, numerous

extraordinary international meetings have been held, among which were the ninth special session of the General Assembly, held from 24 April to 3 May 1978, the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, held in Paris from 20 to 27 May 1981, and the recently concluded International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence.

122. My delegation, therefore, is not in this chamber to reiterate in any great detail the case for Namibian independence; nor are we here solely to reaffirm the established and unambiguous stand of the overwhelming majority of mankind on this issue. Our purpose is to apprise the Council of our considered view that the last opportunity to effect an orderly and peaceful transfer of sovereign power to the Namibian people in the context of the independence of Namibia may soon be forgone unless the Council decides to act here and now.

123. Indonesia is not alone in this view, as 101 Heads of State or Government at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting at New Delhi in March 1983, unanimously underscored the imperative need to bring this critical question before the Security Council for an expeditious resolution.

124. The Secretary-General in his report [*S/15776*] has equally underlined the destructive impact which any further delay in the achievement of Namibian independence will have not only on Namibia itself but also on the wider prospects of peace and security for the region as a whole. I should like here to express Indonesia's deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his dedicated efforts and the strong personal commitment he has shown to the Namibian cause.

125. It sould be recalled that, after so many arduous years of effort, a peaceful and comprehensive settlement appeared temptingly within our reach when, in 1978, agreement was achieved on a United Nations plan for Namibia, in accordance with resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). The optimism that accompanied that major breakthrough was soon to dissipate, however, upon realization that South Africa's initial acceptance of the plan was cynically based on *mala fide* intent. Indeed, since the plan's inception, South Africa has used every dilatory manoeuvre to obstruct and thwart progress towards its implementation. It is no exaggeration to state, therefore, that the situation in Namibia today is significantly more oppressive and volatile than it was five years ago.

126. We do not fail to note the insidious array of measures and policies instituted by the Pretoria régime to perpetuate its illegal control over the Territory. All of these have been comprehensively detailed in the Paris Declaration on Namibia and the Report of the Committee of the Whole and Programme of Action adopted by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held just last month.[5] At this time, however, I shall limit my remarks to some salient decisions adopted by that Conference which my delegation believes should form the basis of our deliberations and subsequent actions. All those decisions are aimed at compelling South Africa to comply with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and are directly addressed to the Security Council.

127. One of the most important conclusions which emerged from that Conference was that South Africa's colonial domination and exploitation of Namibia, its attempts to impose fraudulent constitutional and political schemes and its policies of internal repression and external aggression against neighbouring States have reached such proportions that they have placed international peace and security in imminent jeopardy. The front-line States—Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe—have borne the brunt of South Africa's repeated acts of armed aggression and attempts at military, political and economic destabilization, and even Seychelles has been the target of a crude armed intervention by a mercenary force. In fact, only yesterday, South Africa again unleashed a military attack against Mozambique. Such a continuing threat to the States of the region cannot be tolerated and should be forcefully addressed by the Council.

128. We are of the firm view that the only way to make progress towards peace and stability in the region is through the expeditious implementation of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). Any further delay or vacillation in opposing South Africa's manoeuvres to obstruct the implementation of the United Nations plan can only lead to further escalation of violence and bloodshed. The Council must unambiguously make it clear that the question of Namibia is one of decolonization and reject any attempt to link Namibian independence to extraneous issues, as that will not only retard but also distort the decolonization process. Given the continuing deadlock in the implementation of the plan, owing to South African intransigence and the apparent inability of the contact group to overcome the obstacles in its path, the Council should now resume its central role in putting into effect resolution 435 (1978). It should do so by establishing its own time-frame for action and by charging the Secretary-General with a greater and more direct role in the negotiations among the parties concerned.

129. Another pernicious development that the Council must also effectively address is the flagrant and wilful violation by certain States of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa imposed by resolution 418 (1977). What is particularly ominous is the continuing collaboration between some Member States and the racist régime in the nuclear field. Such assistance has contributed substantially to bolstering the South African war machine and has enabled it to proceed with the total militarization of the Territory.

130. Strict compliance with the arms embargo against South Africa must be ensured. This can best be achieved through an already existing Council mechanism established under resolution 421 (1977) but which, regrettably, has remained ineffective. I am referring to the Committee

of the Security Council, the specific mandate of which is to ensure scrupulous compliance with the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. Its work must be enhanced, more resources should be provided to it and, above all, detected violations must be acted upon as a matter of priority by the Council.

131. In addition to the use of overt military force against the front-line States and SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, South Africa has continued its attempts to destroy the territorial integrity and undermine the economic viability of Namibia. The Council must therefore take firm action against the continuing economic collaboration between certain States or their transnational corporations and the South African occupation régime which has accelerated the already extensive illicit plundering of Namibia's natural wealth, in complete violation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia.[6] Equally, the status of Walvis Bay and the Penguin and other offshore islands should not be questioned or be open to negotiation. They are an integral and inseparable part of Namibian territory, the integrity of which must be maintained.

132. The racist régime's illegal occupation of Namibia has also been further entrenched through a sinister policy of internal social and political fragmentation and by the imposition of puppet régimes. At the same time, South Africa's inhuman practice of *apartheid* has been consciously and ruthlessly extended to Namibia, immeasurably increasing the degradation and suffering of the people.

133. My Government views the disastrous developments in southern Africa with such concern that we have made it a matter of urgent national policy to seek immediate and effective Council action against South Africa. The support of my Government for the valiant struggle of the people of Namibia, under the leadership of SWAPO, and for the front-line States has never been in doubt. We have always scrupulously abided by the mandatory arms embargo, the oil embargo and all voluntary sanctions and boycotts against South Africa. Indonesia has not established, nor will it establish, relations of any kind with the racist Pretoria régime until Namibia and the people of South Africa have fully achieved true emancipation and independence and the odious policy of *apartheid* is for ever abolished. We continue to view the United Nations plan as the only viable and comprehensive framework for a peaceful transfer of power to the Namibian people and we call for its immediate implementation without any further modifications or qualifications.

134. Developments in southern Africa are fraught with dangerous consequences, not only for Namibia and the region but also beyond. For this reason the Paris Conference held last month adopted a Declaration and Programme of Action[5] which, in the view of my delegation, are as rational as they are realistic. We firmly believe that the Council should respond positively to all of the provisions in these documents addressed to it, since the unmistakable reality is that the threat of sanctions and the invocation of partial or voluntary sanctions have proved to be insufficient, and the only course left open is the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions by the Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter.

135. The obdurate refusal by South Africa to comply with its obligations under the Charter has not only undermined the credibility of the United Nations; it poses a challenge to the international legal system as well. The question of the decolonization of Namibia, therefore, transcends the achievement of the legitimate national rights of the Namibian people and impinges upon the principles and cherished values of all civilized nations.

136. This series of meetings of the Security Council is a pivotal one. The decisions that will be taken here will undoubtedly have a decisive impact on the future course of events in southern Africa, as the spectre of intensified armed conflict is looming ominously on the horizon.

137. The inevitability of Namibian independence is beyond any doubt. Our fervent hope is that it will come about through a process of negotiation rather than after prolonged and uncontrollable upheaval and confrontation. As I stated in the beginning, the prospect for a peaceful transition towards Namibian independence is within our reach, but only if the Council lives up to its responsibility under the Charter and decides to act decisively and act now.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

NOTES

[1] A/31/197, annex I, para. 44.

[2] A/34/542, annex I, para. 63

[3] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 972.

[4] *Ibid.*, vol. 1125, No. 17512.

[5] *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF. 120/13), part three.

[6] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24*, Vol. I, annex II.

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UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2441st MEETING: 24 MAY 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2441st MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 24 May 1983, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. M. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2441)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
   Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 11.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Maudave (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite Mr. Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the previous meetings [*2439th and 2440th meetings*] on this item, I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gambia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Hadj Azzout (Algeria), Mr. Jorge (Angola), Mr. Joseph (Australia), Mr. Wasiuddin (Bangladesh), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Mrani Zentar (Morocco), Mr. Lobo (Mozambique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Ozores Typaldos (Panama), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Sallu (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Otunnu (Uganda), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Bassole (Upper Volta), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Democratic

Yemen, Japan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Somalia in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite them to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Kuroda (Japan), Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) and Mr. Adan (Somalia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is Mr. Paulo T. Jorge, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Angola, whom I cordially welcome. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and make his statement.

7. Mr. JORGE (Angola) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to congratulate you most warmly, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council, which meets at a particularly serious moment in the history of the African continent.

8. We feel it is significant that these deliberations of the Council on an African problem should be presided over by an African, and we are happy that the task falls to the representative of Zaire. Your qualities and your personality assure us of the success of our discussions here.

9. It is 17 years since the General Assembly adopted the historic resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, whereby it decided to terminate South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and to assume direct responsibility for the Territory until its accession to independence and to set up an *Ad Hoc* Committee composed of 14 Member States to recommend practical means for the administration of the Territory, so as to enable its people to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence.

10. It is 16 years since the General Assembly adopted resolution 2248 (S-V), of 19 May 1967, which established the United Nations Council for Namibia, with the necessary powers to administer the Territory until independence, to promulgate laws, decrees and administrative regulations, to take as an immediate task all the necessary measures, in consultation with the people of the Territory, for the establishment of a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution on the basis of which elections would be held for the establishment of a legislative assembly and a responsible government, and also to ensure the transfer of all powers to the people of the Territory upon the declaration of independence.

11. Two years ago, faced with the break-down of the preliminary talks in Geneva, full responsibility for which always lay with the racist and Fascist régime in Pretoria and with the United States, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries took the decision to call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council in order to impose comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions against the South African régime so as to oblige it to put an end to its illegal occupation of Namibia. A veto was cast by three permanent members of the Council—who were also members of the contact group of five Western countries—and this prevented the adoption of the required resolutions and demonstrated their connivance with the Pretoria régime and, consequently, paralysed this body of the United Nations and seriously jeopardized its credibility.

12. Two months ago, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi:

> "expressed their deep concern that Namibia's independence continued to be obstructed by the intransigence and persistent refusal of the racist régime of South Africa to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions and decisions on Namibia"

and

> "called upon the United Nations Security Council to meet, as soon as possible, in order to consider further action on the implementation of its plan for Namibia's independence thereby assuming its primary responsibility for implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)." [*See S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, paras. 48 and 49.*]

13. This explains the presence at the United Nations of many Ministers for Foreign Affairs, appointed by the Conference to participate in these meetings of the Council. It should be emphasized that, once again, these initiatives were taken neither by the contact group nor by the Council.

14. To appreciate the true scope of the responsibilities of the Council and also of the contact group, responsibilities which have never been fully shouldered, one need only recall a number of commitments entered into with respect to the situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal occupation of that Territory by South Africa.

15. On several occasions, the General Assembly and the Council have strongly condemned the persistent refusal by South Africa to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, its brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights; reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination, to freedom and national independence in a United Namibia, as well as the legitimacy of their struggle by all means at their disposal; reaffirmed that the illegal occupation of Namibia and the acts of aggression against independent African States launched from bases in Namibia are a serious threat to international peace and security; reaffirmed that the illegal occupation of Namibia is an act of aggression against the Namibian people and against the United Nations as the authority responsible for administering the Territory

until independence; recognized SWAPO and reaffirmed that it is the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people; deeply deplored the policy of States that continue to maintain diplomatic, economic, consular and other relations with South Africa, as well as military or strategic collaboration, all of which has the effect of supporting or encouraging South Africa in its defiance of the United Nations; requested all Member States to cooperate fully with the United Nations Council for Namibia, the legal Administering Authority of the Territory until independence; demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all South African military and paramilitary forces; and so forth.

16. Despite the legality and legitimacy of all these United Nations resolutions, it is deeply regrettable to note that almost all of those provisions have remained a dead letter in that certain Powers have undertaken to hinder deliberately the implementation of those decisions. Each of us knows full well who have been and who still are responsible for such setbacks, suffering and frustration. In no case can the delaying or blocking of the solution to the question of Namibia be imputed to Angola.

17. In his excellent further report on the implementation of resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978), the Secretary-General has given us, most lucidly and frankly, a very clear picture of the evolution of negotiations concerning the process of independence for Namibia. He has stated in his report that:

> "Unfortunately, moreover, the positive side of the balance sheet has been set back by the emergence of other issues which were neither raised nor envisaged at the time when resolution 435 (1978) was adopted or in the subsequent negotiations under United Nations auspices. These issues now apparently constitute the main reason for the delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan." [*S/15776, para. 19.*]

The report also emphasizes that:

> "It is evident that the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978) is having a destructive impact not only on Namibia itself but also on the prospect of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole. The delay also has an adverse effect on international relations in a wider sphere, adding to the prevailing sense of frustration and mistrust, with all that that implies for peace and security in the region." [*Ibid., para. 16.*]

18. While it is true that, in the context of the implementation of the United Nations plan according to resolution 435 (1978), decisions remain to be taken as to whether the electoral system is to be based on proportional representation or single-member voting, and on the composition and deployment of the military component of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and on the date of the cease-fire between SWAPO and the Pretoria régime, it is equally true that the major obstacle would seem to lie in the fact that a single member of the contact group and of the Security Council, the United States, persists in trying to establish a linkage or a parallelism between the process of decolonization or independence for Namibia and the withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist forces from Angola.

19. We feel it is essential, therefore, that the Security Council take duly into consideration the following positions of principle.

20. First, the process of the decolonization or independence of Namibia is not a matter within the competence of the Government of Angola. It is a matter within the competence of the United Nations and it involves all Member States because Namibia is a Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations, which therefore implies that every State should shoulder its own responsibilities. Hence it is unjust that, owing to the selfish interests of some and the unjustified passivity or indifference of others, the Angolan people should be left almost alone to pay an extremely high price for its solidarity, which is reflected in the loss of more than 10,000 human lives, thousands of handicapped and maimed, hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, and $10 billion in material damage caused by the criminal acts of aggression perpetrated by the racist régime of Pretoria since 1975.

21. Secondly, the joint Angolan-Cuban statement of 4 February 1982 states formally and without any ambiguity the situation regarding the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist forces stationed on Angolan territory, as follows:

> "When the Angolan and Cuban Governments so agree, the withdrawal of the Cuban forces stationed in Angolan territory will be carried out by sovereign decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, once there is no further possibility of aggression or armed invasion and, to this end, the Cuban Government reiterates that it will immediately respect any decision taken by the sovereign Government of the People's Republic of Angola concerning the withdrawal of these forces."

22. Thirdly, resolution 435 (1978) remains the sole valid basis for a negotiated solution to the question of Namibia. Thus, to claim a linkage or parallelism between the process of decolonization or independence for Namibia and the withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist forces from Angola is completely incompatible with the letter and spirit of resolution 435 (1978) and constitutes unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of Angola.

23. Fourthly, the legitimacy of the position of Angola and of the front-line States as a whole in rejecting most categorically this so-called linkage is endorsed by a similar position taken by the entire international community. The General Assembly, in its resolution 37/233 B of 20 December 1982, and the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at New Delhi have confirmed this quite clearly and firmly.

24. Five years have passed since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978). It is thus quite legitimate for the Council to be seized once again or to remain seized of the question of Namibia so as to find effective ways and means of ensuring the implementation of its resolutions 385 (1976), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978); this means that the Council would henceforth shoulder once again all the responsibilities incumbent upon it in seeking a negotiated solution to the question of Namibia.

25. In this context, it is essential that the powers of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Council for Namibia be duly strengthened so as to enable them to address themselves to ensuring the implementation of the aforementioned resolutions. But it is also essential that all the parties concerned or interested contribute, individually and collectively, to the commendable efforts that will continue to be made by the Secretary-General so that Namibia can swiftly accede to independence. Angola, for its part, undertakes to continue along this path.

26. Directly faced with threats, acts of aggression and armed invasion by the racist régime of Pretoria since 1975, Angola expects from the Council a decisive commitment to meet the requirements of the moment so as to ensure that the question of Namibia is finally settled.

27. We must recall, however, Council resolutions 428 (1978), 447 (1979), 454 (1979) and 475 (1980), concerning the many premeditated, persistent and continuing acts of armed invasion carried out by South Africa in flagrant violation of the airspace, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola. In those resolutions, the Council, *inter alia*, strongly condemned South Africa's aggression against Angola; demanded that South Africa scrupulously respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola; also demanded that South Africa cease immediately its provocative armed invasions against Angola; requested member States urgently to extend all necessary assistance to Angola and other front-line States; called for the payment by South Africa of full and adequate compensation to Angola for the damage to life and property resulting from these acts of aggression and decided to meet again in the event of further acts of violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola by the South African racist régime, in order to consider the adoption of more effective measures in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VII thereof.

28. Nevertheless, further acts in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola continue to take place, to such an extent that a considerable part of the province of Cunene is and has been occupied by South African troops since August 1981.

29. What are the international community or the States members of the Council, in particular, waiting for before they adopt "more effective measures, in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Charter, including Chapter VII thereof"? Are they waiting for an act of genocide like the one that occurred in Lebanon? What further deliberate acts of violation or armed aggression must take place, how many more human lives must be lost, what further material damage—already reaching enormous and tragic proportions—must be done for the competent international bodies finally to shoulder their responsibilities?

30. Statements by the speakers who have preceded me convince us that, at last, a genuine common political will to reach a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia is emerging and that the disturbing powerlessness of the international community is giving way to a new determination on the part of the Council to take the measures needed to ensure the restoration of peace in southern Africa, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to the Council by the Charter.

31. It is incumbent on the Council to find ways and means of ensuring respect not only for the provisions of the Charter but also, with the same objective, for the decisions taken by all the organs of the United Nations which, as a whole and through the unanimous votes of their members, have for 20 years been calling upon South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and to cease to be a constant threat to international peace and security and to ignore arrogantly the principles upon which the Organization is founded and which we all wish to uphold and maintain.

32. South Africa's despicable aggression against Mozambique, carried out by racist troops at the very moment the Council was convening its 2439th meeting to try to settle the question of Namibian independence, seems unfortunately to be proof that the Pretoria régime is not in any way prepared to abide by the wishes of the international community and to respect the sovereignty of States in the southern part of the continent of Africa but, on the contrary, has decided to persist in its bloodthirsty and inhuman policy of terror.

33. We wish to express our absolute outrage at this challenge to the international community by South Africa. We trust that the Council will join its voice to that of Angola in strongly condemning South Africa for this new act of aggression and reaffirming the Council's solidarity with Mozambique in its time of trial.

34. This is no time for futile resolutions or ambiguous condemnations that leave South Africa free to pursue its efforts to destabilize the countries of southern Africa and to plunder and subjugate Namibia, thereby undermining faith in and respect for the United Nations.

35. It is imperative that, together, we make every effort to ensure that an independent and sovereign Namibia rejoins the community of nations.

36. The struggle continues; victory is certain!

37. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is Mr. Hugh L. Shearer, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Jamaica. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

38. Mr. SHEARER (Jamaica): Allow me, on behalf of my delegation, to join other representatives in extending to you, Sir, our congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I have every confidence in your able leadership as you preside over these very important meetings.

39. The question of Namibia, first brought before the United Nations in 1946, continues to be a burning issue on the agenda of this world body. It is a colonial situation that persists in South Africa to this day, despite the fact that some 17 years have elapsed since the General Assembly, in its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. By that action the United Nations assumed responsibility for Namibia, and since then it has sought to exercise its authority through the United Nations Council for Namibia, which was established by resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967.

40. Over the past 17 years, South Africa has been allowed to continue to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence, in defiance of the will of the international community and with contemptuous disregard of all the resolutions of the United Nations and of the 1971 opinion by the International Court of Justice that South Africa had no legal right to Namibia.[1]

41. It is against the background of South Africa's continued refusal to comply with the United Nations resolutions on Namibia, especially Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and of the brutal oppression of the Namibian people that the current series of meetings was convened. Innumerable conferences, debates and consultations have been held in the past in an effort to free the Namibians from the dehumanizing and degrading policy of *apartheid* and to allow them to achieve the full exercise of their inalienable rights. These have not produced satisfactory results.

42. The Council, at this series of meetings in particular, must address itself to the task of effectively bringing pressure to bear on the intransigent Pretoria régime to comply with resolution 435 (1978).

43. It was by resolution 435 (1978) that the Security Council approved a proposal [*S/12636*] designed to achieve a peaceful, negotiated, political settlement that could lead Namibia to self-determination and independence. The fact that, in the intervening years, this proposal has gained universal acceptance is testimony to its continuing relevance and viability. The cardinal elements of the proposal were the signing of a cease-fire agreement, the establishment of a demilitarized zone, the deployment of UNTAG, the holding of free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations and the rejection of any internal settlement that would foist South Africa's hand-picked puppets on the Namibian people. This proposal has not yet been implemented.

44. The Secretary-General's report [*S/15776*] is before the Council. It provides not only a timely, objective and factual summary of developments concerning the attempts of the Secretary-General to implement resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) but also an ominous reminder of the perils that will confront southern Africa and the international community if the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people are further delayed.

45. By General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, the United Nations assumed responsibility for the welfare of Namibia and its people. This responsibility cannot be considered fully discharged until the Namibian people are free from colonial rule and are provided with an opportunity for the free and unfettered exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

46. There have been times when it was felt that Namibia was on the verge of achieving its independence. The elation and hope of these moments have always been dissipated by one or other of South Africa's delaying tactics.

47. The contact group had, until recently, made some progress towards a solution of the Namibian issue. They had put forward proposals which had been accepted by SWAPO and the front-line States. One member of the group has, however, introduced the concept of linkage into the debate on Namibia's independence. The Government of Jamaica joins the front-line States, SWAPO and the rest of the international community in outright rejection of the linking of Namibia's independence with the withdrawal of troops from Angola. As I stated in my address to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, the two are separate issues and must be dealt with separately.[2]

48. The Non-Aligned Movement has constantly rejected linkage, most recently at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 11 March 1983. The final document states:

> "The Conference expressed its deep concern that the Western contact group was unable to detach and dissociate itself from the extraneous issue of linkage between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola insisted upon by one of its members. The Conference stressed that the linkage, which was totally incompatible with the letter and spirit of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), constituted an impediment to the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia." [*See S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 47.*]

49. Since the introduction of the concept of linkage and the philosophy of constructive engagement with South Africa, the prospect of a solution to the Namibian issue has receded. There is also growing concern within the international community that the contact group has not succeeded in securing South Africa's compliance with resolution 435 (1978) and has therefore outlived its usefulness.

50. My Government is not at all convinced that the contact group has in fact been able to achieve the substantial progress which it claims has been made since the last Council debate on Namibia, in 1981 [*2267th to 2277th meetings*]. It is also our firm belief that the persistent failure of some of its members to observe scrupulously the ban imposed by the United Nations on military sales to South Africa has only served to strengthen the hand of the racist Pretoria régime in its stubborn policies of defiance and intransigence.

51. The need for urgent settlement of the Namibian issue is further reinforced by recent troubling events in Namibia. In January of this year, South Africa, again in defiance of the United Nations and while in discussion with the contact group, took direct control of Namibia after the resignation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. We are deeply concerned that this move will only serve to further entrench South Africa in Namibia, resulting in the annexation of Namibia to South African territory.

52. Meanwhile the resources of Namibia are being ruthlessly exploited by South Africa, not for the benefit of the Namibian people but for the benefit of South Africa and some Western countries. One mine alone, the Rössing mine, from which South Africa draws some $500 million per year, produces 10 per cent of the total amount of uranium consumed by the Western industrialized countries. South Africa is able to control the major part of the world's uranium resources and of production available for export. Nearly all of Namibia's diamond, zinc, tin, lead, vanadium and tungsten production is sent to South Africa for processing, use and sale, from which it makes millions of dollars in profit. In this exploitation by the mining companies in Namibia, African workers receive only about 5 or 6 per cent of the wages paid to the whites. The ratio of *per capita* income of a Namibian African worker to that of a white worker in Namibia is 1 to 24.

53. In parallel with this ruthless exploitation, the racist Pretoria régime continues to perpetrate the most outrageous aggression against the neighbouring front-line States. The continued occupation of Angolan territory, the arrogant and brutal attack on the capital of Lesotho last December and the bombing of Mozambique cities by the South African Air Force in the last few days are but examples of a massive and deliberate campaign of terror being waged by South Africa against its neighbours. The death, destruction and distress that have resulted and the escalation in political tension that is being produced can no longer be ignored by the international community.

54. In view of this situation, it now becomes incumbent on the Council to find other means of bringing South Africa to heel, particularly in view of the fact that Namibia remains the direct responsibility of the United Nations until self-determination and national independence are achieved in the Territory.

55. The unavoidable question to which the Council must find a credible response is: What more must now be done, and how can it be achieved, to compel South Africa to co-operate fully in the implementation of the United Nations plan for the settlement of the Namibian question?

56. I must here emphasize the fundamental role and responsibility of the permanent members of the Council to bring the requisite pressure to bear in order to compel South Africa to live up to its international obligations.

57. We must not forget that the Council, in addition to its responsibility to Namibia, also has a duty to maintain peace and security in southern Africa, where the front-line States have been victims of South Africa's unprovoked acts of aggression.

58. Therefore I wish to propose that, arising out of this current debate: first, the Security Council must reassert its responsibility for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978); secondly, the Council must fix a time-frame for implementation of the various stages implicit in resolution 435 (1978); thirdly, the Council must take steps to ensure that South Africa does not introduce institutional measures in Namibia which would constitute a hindrance to the Security Council's mandate; and, fourthly, the Council, in fulfilling its task, must give emphasis to the role of the Secretary-General as envisaged in resolution 435 (1978).

59. The issue before the Council today involves the question of the credibility of the United Nations. Namibia is the only case in which the United Nations has assumed responsibility for a territory in order to bring about the independence of its people. Yet the United Nations has allowed its authority to be flouted by a régime, based on the vicious principles of *apartheid*, which has usurped the Territory and its people.

60. The Council must be aware that the alternative to its taking action now is more bloody and destructive activity in all of southern Africa. Can the Council resign itself to that? On few other occasions have the issues been so clear and the moral rights so unassailable. There can be no excuse for inaction now.

61. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

62. Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): My delegation previously expressed its congratulations to Mr. Umba di Lutete on his assumption of the presidency for this month. Today I wish to convey my delegation's congratulations to you personally, Mr. President. I am happy to see another true son of Africa presiding over the Council today, especially at a time like this when the Council is dealing with one of the major problems confronting our African continent.

63. Once again the Council is resuming consideration of the question of Namibia, a question that has been considered by the Council at scores of meetings and has been debated by the General Assembly at all its regular

sessions since 1946 and at two special sessions and one emergency special session. Hundreds of resolutions on it have been adopted in the two forums. The question is well known in all its details. I shall not, therefore, go into details now and shall confine myself to certain observations on the present situation in Namibia and to the reasons why the attainment of its independence has so far been obstructed.

64. More than 16 years have elapsed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI), which terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. The Security Council endorsed that in its resolution 264 (1969), in which it recognized the termination of the Mandate and called upon the Pretoria régime to withdraw immediately its administration from the Territory. However, the racist régime disregarded the Assembly resolution, did not respond to that of the Council and persisted in flouting the will of the international community.

65. More than four years ago, the Security Council adopted its resolution 435 (1978), which endorses the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. At the time, the majority of the world's countries believed that this augured well for the early accession to independence of Namibia, because the United Nations plan was the work of the Western contact group, made up of five major Powers with strong and close relations with the racist régime in South Africa, and it was felt that the group could therefore bring pressure to bear on South Africa to comply with the will of the international community. My country was not among those optimists, because it realized that those States—or some of them—were the allies of the racist régime, seeing it as the protector of their economic and strategic interests in southern Africa. Over the past four years it has become crystal-clear that those optimists were very much mistaken, and the validity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's doubts has been proved. We see the Namibian people still suffering under the yoke of colonialism and the policy of *apartheid*, and denied its right of self-determination.

66. The majority of the countries of the world have understood for many years the racist régime's aims in southern Africa and the purpose of the prevarication and delaying tactics it employs in order to prolong its occupation of Namibia and impose a puppet régime on the Namibian people. But some Western States, foremost among them the United States of America, do not care to recognize these facts. They have turned a deaf ear to the voice of reason and have opposed the adoption by the Council of any measures in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter to compel the racist régime to comply with United Nations resolutions and to withdraw from Namibia. All members of the Council will doubtless recall the result of the last series of meetings held on the question of Namibia, in April 1981 [*ibid.*], when three States Members belonging to the Western contact group had recourse to the veto against the draft resolutions before the Council.

67. It would seem that certain major Western countries, first among them the United States, are not really serious in their commitment to help the United Nations find a solution to the Namibian question. So far, they have exerted no pressure worth mentioning on South Africa, and that leads us to believe that their main concern is their own interests and the enormous profits they reap through their corporations from operations in Namibia and South Africa. It is unfortunate that those countries continue to encourage their corporations to invest in Namibia and South Africa in spite of the numerous United Nations resolutions calling upon States not to deal with the *apartheid* régime.

68. The report of the United Nations Council for Namibia[3] notes the presence of 236 companies of Western States and Israel with subsidiaries operating in Namibia. Among them, 190 are based in the States of the Western contact group. These companies directly support the racist régime in South Africa, and this has enabled it to strengthen its domination of Namibia and to persist in its policy of racial segregation in southern Africa. Their activities are in direct contravention of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia,[4] and are seriously depleting the resources of Namibia.

69. The racist régime receives financial support from Western financial institutions and banks. Loans to the *apartheid* régime between 1979 and mid-1982 amounted to $2.7 billion. That sum covers South Africa's military expenses in Namibia.

70. In the military field, despite the long time that has passed since the adoption of Council resolution 418 (1977) imposing the arms embargo against South Africa, the embargo is not being strictly observed, and the racist régime has been able to receive huge quantities of arms through the collusion of the Zionist entity and certain Western Powers. With the help of certain of those States in the field of military technology, the racist régime has been able to develop its military industry and has achieved near self-sufficiency in most kinds of military equipment. It is thus able to increase its military power, maintain its occupation of Namibia and intensify its barbaric acts of aggression against neighbouring States, violating their sovereignty and destabilizing them. The latest example of this is the act of aggression against Mozambique on 23 May—an act which the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya condemns.

71. Well-founded reports indicate that South Africa maintains over 100,000 soldiers in Namibia. The report of the United Nations Council for Namibia states that

> "an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 mercenaries, mainly from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Australia, Chile and Israel, are reported to be fighting alongside the South Africa forces in the campaign to crush the Namibian liberation struggle".[5]

72. The racist régime of South Africa has consolidated its occupation of Namibia thanks to the absolute support it receives from certain Western countries that see it as guarding their interests in southern Africa and thanks to the support it receives from another racist régime: the Zionist entity in occupied Palestine. The similarities between the two régimes and their aggressive nature are obvious to all. The racist régime of South Africa denies the black majority its fundamental rights and denies the Namibian people their right to self-determination and independence while the racist Zionist régime denies the Palestinian people their right to self-determination and to establish an independent State of their own. The racist régime occupies Namibia and a portion of Angolan territory, while the racist Zionist entity occupies part of the Arab countries. The racist régime in South Africa has linked its withdrawal from Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola: these are legitimate forces whose presence is the sole concern of the Governments of Cuba and Angola. The racist Zionist entity has linked its withdrawal from Lebanon to the withdrawal of the Arab forces which are now legitimately present there: their presence is the sole concern of the Government of Lebanon and the other Arab parties concerned. Both régimes have committed repeated acts of aggression against neighbouring countries on the pretext of pursuing members of liberation movements, whom they wrongly call "terrorists".

73. The attempt to link the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is nothing but a delaying tactic worked out by South Africa in collaboration with the United States Administration. Its purpose is to delay the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, deplete the region's resources to the greatest extent possible, and give the racist régime more time to create puppets to which it can hand over the government of the country. That manoeuvre has been condemned in many international forums, most recently at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, at New Delhi.

74. The crisis in Namibia worsens daily. The acts of oppression, suppression, detention and assassination have become daily practices of the racist régime against the black citizens of Namibia. That régime is also stepping up its evil manoeuvres within Namibia in a desperate attempt to oust SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people. It pursues the members of SWAPO with increasing determination in its desperate efforts to establish a puppet government in the Territory.

75. The situation in southern Africa constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security through the deteriorating situation in Namibia. The international community must redouble its efforts to bring Namibia to independence, in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, especially Security Council resolution 435 (1978). My country believes that independence for Namibia can be achieved only by the following means: first, complete and unlimited support by all States for the praiseworthy efforts of the Secretary-General to ensure implementation of the United Nations plan; secondly, reaffirmation of the fact that the two parties to the conflict are SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people struggling for the independence of the Territory, and the racist Pretoria régime, which is occupying the Territory illegally; thirdly, support for the armed struggle of SWAPO in order to step up pressure on the racist régime and make it comply with the will of the international community and withdraw from Namibia; fourthly, the formulation of a specific time-table for the strict and immediate implementation of resolution 435 (1978), without any modification and in such a way as to guarantee the complete independence of Namibia and the sovereignty of the Namibian people, under SWAPO, over all its Territory, including Walvis Bay and all the offshore islands; and fifthly, the imposition of mandatory sanctions, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, thus compelling the racist régime to withdraw its administration from Namibia.

76. My delegation sincerely hopes that the efforts of the Council will be crowned with success and that the Namibian people will be able to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. My delegation wishes to utter a warning against the manoeuvres to which South Africa and its allies have recourse while claiming to seek a peaceful solution. The purpose of those manoeuvres is to bypass the true liberation movement, SWAPO, and impose a suspect solution whose ultimate result would be a puppet régime that would support the interests of the imperialist States and do their bidding.

77. In conclusion, I should like to confirm the unlimited support of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the Namibian people, led by SWAPO, in their just struggle for self-determination and independence. We shall continue to give all possible material and moral assistance to those heroic people and to the people of South Africa until they achieve independence and the complete elimination of racism in southern Africa. We also confirm our solidarity with the front-line States in the face of the numerous acts of aggression against them committed by the racist régime. We condemn those acts as well as South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia and part of the territory of Angola.

78. Finally, I should like to express my delegation's great appreciation and gratitude for the efforts of the United Nations Council for Namibia, led by Mr. Paul Lusaka of Zambia, and of the Secretary-General, to ensure the early accession to independence of Namibia.

79. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Algeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

80. Mr. HADJ AZZOUT (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): I should like first of all to convey to you, Sir, the congratulations of the Algerian delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. Your knowledge of international affairs and your

experience ensure that the Council will have wise guidance in its consideration of the serious issue before it today. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, on having guided the deliberations of the Council last month.

81. It is almost five years now since the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), whereby it warned the Pretoria régime that, if it did not co-operate in the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 435 (1978), the Council would be compelled

> "to meet forthwith to initiate appropriate actions under the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VII thereof, so as to ensure South Africa's compliance with the aforementioned resolutions".

82. That commitment having been formally entered into, Africa and the non-aligned countries, faced with the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and the stepping-up of the aggressive policy of South Africa, decided, as early as April 1981, to request a meeting of the Council [*S/14434*] to enable it to fulfil its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and to ensure respect for its own decisions. However, that opportunity could not be seized owing to the veto of three permanent members of the Council, those very countries which had given an undertaking to the international community that they would help to bring about the speedy implementation of the process of decolonization in Namibia.

83. By preventing the United Nations from adopting the only measures that could put an end to South Africa's defiance, those vetoes in the Council helped delay the implementation of the settlement plan and prolong the suffering of the Namibian people. Today, two years later, the situation has not changed. The process of implementing the decolonization of Namibia remains in the impasse into which South Africa and some of its allies wished to lead the efforts of the United Nations. Namibia is still illegally occupied, its people ruthlessly oppressed, persecuted and tortured and its natural resources plundered. Its territory is now being used for the launching of large-scale aggression against neighbouring countries.

84. Drawing the political lessons from this deadlock and its dangers not only for stability and security throughout the southern part of Africa but also for world peace, the non-aligned countries decided to renew their appeal to the Council to avoid the irrevocable. The Heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries, at their conference at New Delhi from 7 to 11 March 1983, while reiterating their firm support for the struggle waged by the Namibian people under their sole legitimate representative, SWAPO, decided to call upon the Council to meet to

> "consider further action on the implementation of its plan for Namibia's independence thereby assuming its primary responsibility for implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978)". [*See S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 49.*]

85. The presence here of many Ministers of Foreign Affairs attests to the resolve of the non-aligned countries to find a genuine political solution, in the hope that the Council will take the measures dictated by the extreme gravity of the situation.

86. In a similar spirit, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris from 25-29 April 1983, with the participation of all Member States of the United Nations, endorsed that approach in its turn.[6]

87. We venture to believe that these appeals, which reflect not only deep anxiety and concern over the many consequences of the deadlock but also the desire to ensure international peace and security, will finally be heeded by the Council.

88. These appeals are all the more imperative in that only yesterday Mozambique, a sovereign country, a member of the OAU and of the United Nations, was the object of aggression by the racist régime of South Africa. That was not, unfortunately, the first time—and it certainly will not be the last—that that racist régime, thanks to the multilateral support it constantly receives from certain Western countries, has committed such acts, thus outrageously violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African States in the region.

89. The question of Namibia is too well known to the Council to need a long exposition. It is, incontestably, one of decolonization, for the facts of the matter are crystal clear.

90. Need I recall that, in 1966, the United Nations entered into a commitment to shoulder direct responsibility for the Territory of Namibia and to bring to completion the process of liberation for that country? Since then, an international consensus has emerged, confirming the illegality of South Africa's occupation of the Territory, the absolute right of the Namibian people to independence, the legitimacy of their national liberation struggle, strict respect for the territorial integrity of their country, and the position of SWAPO as their sole legitimate representative.

91. Everything seemed to indicate, therefore, that this problem of a people deprived of its right to self-determination and independence, a people subjected to occupation of its territory, was, thanks to the United Nations, going to be solved in favour of genuine independence for the Territory. But despite that consensus of the international community, backed up by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,[1] which declared South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal, the Pretoria régime has continued to mobilize its political and military machinery in order to apply a neo-colonial solution to Namibia.

92. Need I recall the exclusive responsibility of South Africa in the failure of all the initiatives to secure implementation of the United Nations plan in accordance with

Council resolutions 385 (1976), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)? Those resolutions, reflecting the international consensus and expressing the common will to bring about the swift decolonization of Namibia, set forth the terms and conditions necessary to establish and strengthen the process that would lead to that decolonization.

93. By the same token, need I recall that South Africa's responsibility for the failure of those initiatives, like its continuing illegal occupation of Namibia, its successive attempts to pervert the process of decolonization of the Territory and its repeated acts of aggression against the sovereign States in the region should have led the Council to take stronger action to fulfil its primary mission—that of guarantor for international peace and security? Indeed, we expected such action all the more, since, as early as 1963, the Council had described South Africa's actions as seriously disturbing international peace and security.

94. One could go on endlessly about other decisions taken but never implemented, deadlines set but never respected, promises made but always broken, sanctions called for but never applied.

95. The impasse in which this question of Namibia is now and the attempts to divert the decolonization process from the normal course as prescribed by the United Nations, are matters of serious concern to the countries of Africa, whose energies are directed towards completing the liberation of the continent.

96. The situation is all the more serious in that South Africa is sustained in its defiance by the support of certain Powers with which it has secure and privileged relationships.

97. While this attitude on the part of South Africa was foreseeable, it being part of the logic of the *apartheid* system, we nevertheless expected those who had initiated the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian question to exert the necessary pressure on the Pretoria régime to ensure implementation of the plan. The contact group, which carried out the pre-implementation talks and took action to ensure that SWAPO and the front-line States would be present at the talks, should have shown a little more determination to ensure that right would prevail. This lack of political will reflected a traditional position taken by some countries whose primary concern is to preserve their strategic and economic interests.

98. The Council, which endorsed the initiative of the five Western Powers, hoping to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia, can see today, five years later, just how unwilling some of those Powers were to live up to the commitment they had entered into. Moreover, the unjustified linkage of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and independence for Namibia strengthens the temptation for the Pretoria régime to apply its own internal solution in Namibia.

99. This linkage, which is contrary to the spirit and the letter of the settlement plan, formulated in this crucial phase of the decolonization of Namibia, further hinders a process which has already taken far too long and also diverts it from its normal course. To try to link a sovereign decision by a State to a genuine problem of decolonization on which there is international unanimity is seriously to jeopardize the efforts that the community of nations has made, with so much patience and perseverance, to achieve a just and peaceful settlement of the problem of Namibia. That is why Africa, first of all, then the General Assembly, in its resolution 37/233 B, adopted at the thirty-seventh session and, recently, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence firmly rejected any such linkage.

100. In this decisive phase of the settlement of the Namibian question we must strongly reaffirm the full and entire responsibility of the United Nations for the process of Namibia's accession to independence, with strict respect for the provisions of resolution 435 (1978).

101. Because it has the responsibility for the decolonization of Namibia, because it is the guarantor for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council must respond fully to the obligations incumbent upon it and take the necessary measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

102. Faced with the prevarications of South Africa and the intensification of its policy of oppression and aggression, the Council must translate into action its will to ensure respect for its own decisions, for the Pretoria régime will never accord justice to the Namibian people or submit to international legality unless forced to do so. Experience has abundantly demonstrated this truth, whose consideration we have postponed for too long.

103. The application of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the South African régime is now essential. The Council must take an unequivocal position on the complete implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) so as to enable the Secretary-General to play his full part as the person primarily responsible for the implementation of the settlement plan decided upon by the Organization.

104. In this connection, the Algerian delegation would like to emphasize that it endorses the conclusions of the Secretary-General as contained in his report [*S/15776*].

105. Lastly, certain members of the contact group must stop looking at the question of Namibia in an East-West context and from the viewpoint of geostrategic power. If they abandoned this approach, which only diverts the decolonization process in Namibia from its natural course, the contact group would be moving with the tide of history, that is, of decolonization.

106. The question of Namibia has been clearly established by the international community as one of decolonization, and Namibia must achieve independence

through the implementation in good faith of the settlement plan drawn up in detail by the Organization.

107. We should like to believe that, at these meetings, the Security Council will prove equal to its primary task and respond to the desire of the international community for international peace and security.

108. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Gambia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

109. Mr. BLAIN (Gambia): My delegation is grateful for this opportunity to participate in the work of the Council. Permit me at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for the month of May. It is a source of immense satisfaction for my delegation to see the affairs of this body entrusted to a diplomat of your proven qualities, representing as you do a sister African republic which has established a reputation as a staunch supporter of the purposes and principles of the United Nations and with which my Government enjoys the most cordial relations.

110. After 100 uninterrupted years of colonial domination and foreign occupation, the Namibian people continue to be denied their inalienable right to self-determination. At this nadir in the history of Namibia, even the most optimistic can discern few, if any, signs which presage an end to this long tragedy.

111. Yet, it is not for want of effort on the part of the international community that this situation persists. The successive resolutions adopted by the General Assembly since 1966 and by the Security Council since 1969 bear testimony to the patient efforts which have been made to terminate, by peaceful negotiation, South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. Regrettably, these diplomatic initiatives have hitherto failed to achieve a settlement. At the same time, the situation in and around Namibia has continued to register a steady deterioration and has now assumed critical proportions, with dire implications for international peace and security.

112. It was in response to this crisis that the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries decided at New Delhi last March to request the present series of meetings of the Council with a view to generating fresh momentum for the stalled negotiations on the implementation of the plan for Namibia's independence.

113. Following the revocation of Pretoria's Mandate by the General Assembly in 1966 and the creation in the following year of the United Nations Council for Namibia as the sole legal Administering Authority of that Territory, the illegality of South Africa's continued occupation was definitely established by the International Court of Justice in 1971 in a ruling endorsed by the Council in resolution 301 (1971). Over the next few years a series of diplomatic initiatives was launched under the aegis of the Council in order to permit the free exercise by the Namibian people of their right to self-determination. These efforts, however, were frustrated at every turn by the duplicity of an intransigent Pretoria, which proceeded for its own part to consolidate its illegal occupation of the Territory. These actions were unequivocally condemned by the Council in resolution 385 (1976).

114. In 1978, the expectations of the world community were raised by the endorsement of the United Nations plan for Namibia in resolution 435 (1978). It should be recalled, however, that, from the African point of view, the plan was far from perfect, failing as it did to accommodate a number of major concerns, including, *inter alia*, the principle that Walvis Bay and its offshore islands constituted an integral part of Namibia's territory. Yet SWAPO, prompted by its genuine desire for a peaceful settlement, accepted the plan in a historic compromise.

115. My delegation wishes at this juncture to pay a tribute to the statesmanship shown by SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

116. For the overwhelming majority of the international community, the distinguished parentage of the United Nations plan and its formal acceptance by the occupying Power, South Africa, portended an early and peaceful transition to independence in Namibia. However, these legitimate expectations were immediately demolished by the treachery of the racist régime, which proceeded to organize sham elections aimed at a so-called internal settlement. Any vestige of credibility which Pretoria may have continued to enjoy in certain quarters disappeared in January 1981, when, to the disappointment of the contact group, it deliberately sabotaged the pre-implementation meeting convened in Geneva to establish practical modalities for implementing resolution 435 (1978).

117. In April 1981, the Security Council met at the request of the Group of African States [*S/14434*] to consider the implication of South Africa's continued disregard of both the resolutions of this prestigious body and the precepts of international law. At that time, the Council was prevented from applying the appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations because it was felt that the policy of constructive engagement offered meaningful prospects of a settlement.

118. Hitherto this approach has produced results of doubtful value. Far from prompting South Africa to respect its obligations under the relevant United Nations resolutions, the policy of constructive engagement has resulted in the totally unacceptable linkage of Namibia's independence with the extraneous issue of the Cuban presence in Angola. Disavowed by the overwhelming majority of the international community and rejected by the recent International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, this element has no place under resolution 435 (1978), which

forms the sole basis for the transition to independence of Namibia.

119. South Africa meanwhile has embarked on further serious breaches of international peace and security. It is perhaps unnecessary to recall that the Council is already seized of two major acts of aggression perpetrated by the racist régime: the mercenary invasion of Seychelles in December 1981 and the attack on Maseru in February 1983.

120. At the same time, South Africa continues illegally to occupy areas of Angola, a sovereign State, while maintaining an intense campaign of destabilization against Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Less than 48 hours ago, as if to underscore Pretoria's utter disregard of the rules of international law, the racist régime launched a massive and unprovoked air strike against the capital of Mozambique.

121. The Gambia unequivocally condemns these repeated criminal acts of aggression. It seems appropriate to recall at this juncture that the Charter prescribes specific measures to be applied in such circumstances.

122. As Namibia enters its hundredth year of subjection to foreign occupation, it is perhaps timely to review briefly the long ordeal endured by the people of that country. The fate of Namibia can be said to have been sealed at the Berlin Conference of 1884. For the next 30 years, that is, until the outbreak of the First World War, the Territory was subjected to a systematic campaign of genocide in which one third of the indigenous population was decimated. History records that it was during that sombre period that the world's first extermination camps were established and operated—in Namibia.

123. In 1919, following the cessation of hostilities, South Africa assumed responsibility for the Territory under a Mandate conferred by the newly established League of Nations. Despite the principle in article 22 (1) of the Covenant of the League of Nations "that the well-being and development of [the peoples of Mandated Territories] form a sacred trust", South Africa immediately imposed its heinous system of discriminatory laws and practices upon the Territory.

124. Even after the establishment of the United Nations, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Namibian ordeal continued—for the Pretoria régime, refusing to yield the Territory to the Organization's trusteeship system, maintained and indeed intensified its ruthless exploitation of Namibia's human and material resources. Pass laws, the Masters and Servants Proclamation and the fragmentation of their homeland into bantustans have continued to define the inhuman existence imposed upon the Namibian people.

125. In addition to the weighty legal arguments already adduced, there are thus pressing moral and humanitarian imperatives for the adoption of effective measures to put an end to the long ordeal of Namibia. The Gambia considers that the framework for such a settlement already exists in resolution 435 (1978) and that what is needed at this juncture is the political will to implement fully the provisions of that resolution.

126. On 27 July 1978—as resolution 432 (1978) was adopted—the representative of a permanent Member State said the following:

> "By approving this proposal for Namibian independence, at one and the same time we vote for an independent Namibia and we take a step to strengthen the prestige of the United Nations and its ability to respond to critical problems wherever they arise." [*2082nd meeting, para. 25.*]

Since that time, however, the plan has remained a dead letter, and the authority and prestige of the Organization have been significantly eroded. Over the last year alone, the Council, as the competent United Nations body, has been seized of a succession of crises, often involving grave breaches of international peace and security, on which, sadly, it has been unable to act decisively.

127. In the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization that he submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session,[7] the Secretary-General attributed that state of affairs to the increasing disregard by Member States of the resolutions and decisions adopted by the competent organs of the United Nations. If this disturbing trend is to be reversed, the Security Council, as the supreme organ of the United Nations, must be prepared to enforce its resolutions, particularly those which concern Namibia, a Territory for which the United Nations is the sole legal Administering Authority. I take this opportunity to commend the energetic and relentless efforts of the Secretary-General aimed at an early and peaceful resolution of the problem.

128. There can be no retreat from the historic compromise achieved in resolution 435 (1978). To demand further concessions from SWAPO would be to heap insult upon the manifold injuries which the Namibian people have already endured for too long.

129. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the acting Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Mr. Raúl Roa Kouri. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

130. Mr. ROA KOURI (*interpretation from Spanish*): On behalf of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, I thank the Council for giving me the opportunity to address it on the item now under consideration, the question of Namibia. However, we deeply regret the fact that this is necessary.

131. I should also like to express my satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the Council on this important occasion. I am sure that, once again, you will honour the commitment of the people and Government of Zaire to the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence.

132. In September 1978, when the Council met to adopt its resolution 435 (1978), the majority of the members of the international community harboured the justifiable hope that, within a year, the suffering people of Namibia would already be beginning to enjoy the fruits of their hard-won independence. In just four months, however, five years will have passed since that meeting without much real progress having been made. Instead of proceeding to hold free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, in accordance with resolution 435 (1978), South Africa has made a mockery of the hopes of the international community, taking advantage of the situation to strengthen its military occupation of Namibia, stepping up its oppression of the Namibian people and increasing its acts of aggression against the front-line States and other neighbouring African countries. It can be no surprise to us, then, that the international community has lost what little faith it might once have had in South Africa's good intentions and now feels it necessary to reassess, promptly and thoroughly, the usefulness of the measures so far adopted to arrive at a solution.

133. I shall not take time today to mention where responsibilities lie, because everyone knows; neither does this seem the proper time for recriminations. Those responsible for the failure to achieve the results that we were told were imminent five years ago will be judged by history once the urgent task of obtaining South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia has been concluded.

134. The Special Committee has been considering the question of Namibia since its establishment in 1962. Since that time, the Committee has clearly understood that, in order to ensure the independence of the Territory as quickly as possible, urgent and positive action was required from the United Nations, specifically, the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. The Special Committee is still convinced that there will be no progress in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) unless, at the same time, the coercive action provided for in the Charter of the United Nations is taken.

135. The Special Committee long ago rejected the reasoning of those who in the past have thwarted the action of the Council, alleging that South Africa would respond to reason rather than to force. In fact, it is now abundantly clear that South Africa has viewed the inaction of the Council as a blank cheque for delaying negotiations for obviously spurious reasons, reducing what was conceived as a serious, honest effort to achieve a balanced solution to a contemptible farce. It is also clear that only by bringing strong economic pressure to bear on South Africa can that country be forced to reconsider its current policy of defiance and scorn towards the international community.

136. The Special Committee has also categorically rejected all efforts to link the question of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) to the withdrawal of foreign forces from Angola. Such efforts will not only delay the decolonization process but also represent brazen interference in the affairs of sovereign States. This point of view of the Special Committee has been broadly endorsed by the international community, as is clear not only from the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March of this year, but also from the recent International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April.

137. By contrast with South Africa, in the five years since the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, has demonstrated a praiseworthy willingness to facilitate the negotiating process and clear the way for the holding of free elections on the basis of universal suffrage. On more than one occasion, SWAPO has accepted suggestions from the contact group, even when it was not to its advantage. Only the fact that South Africa is not equally committed to reaching an agreement has prevented the aforementioned position of SWAPO from being properly rewarded.

138. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to pay a tribute, on behalf of the Special Committee, to the front-line States, which have given outstanding and unswerving support to the efforts of the Namibian people to achieve their independence. The sufferings that they have borne and are continuing to bear for this just cause clearly reflect their commitment to peace, justice and the freedom of peoples. As has been repeatedly pointed out by the Special Committee, the Security Council must, in its discussions, bear in mind that time is running out. If resolution 435 (1978) is not implemented soon, South Africa will continue to consolidate its illegal occupation through internal elections or other procedures. With a view to preventing any procrastinatory manoeuvres and putting an end once and for all to the sacrifice and suffering of the Namibian people, the Council must take resolute action, including, in particular, the implementation of comprehensive sanctions.

139. As a corollary to that action, the international community must continue to give every possible assistance to the people of Namibia so that, under the leadership of SWAPO, they can continue to accelerate the decolonization process. In the considered opinion of the Special Committee, concerted action by all these forces could, even at this stage, prevent the situation in southern Africa from degenerating into a general state of war with unforeseeable consequences not only for Africa but for the entire world community.

140. In conclusion, wisdom suggests that the solution to the problem should rest with the Council and that the

role of the Secretary-General should be strengthened in order to carry out the provisions of resolution 435 (1978) as quickly as possible.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

[2] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 22nd meeting, para 135.

[3] A/CONF.120/8.

[4] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24*, vol. I, annex II.

[5] A/CONF.120/3 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 30.

[6] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part three.

[7] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 1.*

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SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council.* The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2442nd MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 25 May 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. M. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2442)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
   Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 11.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ramlogun (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite Mr. Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2439th to 2441st meetings*], I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Canada, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gambia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Panama, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Hadj Azzout (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Joseph (Australia), Mr. Wasiuddin (Bangladesh), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Kuroda (Japan), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Mrani Zentar (Morocco), Mr. Lobo (Mozambique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Ozores Typaldos (Panama), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Sallu (Sierra Leone), Mr. Adan (Somalia), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Otunnu (Uganda), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Bassole (Upper Volta), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Bulgaria, Chile and Venezuela in which they request to be invited to take part in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite them to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Trucco (Chile) and Mr. Martini Urdaneta (Venezuela) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members of the Council have before them document S/15781 containing the text of a letter dated 20 May 1983 from the representative of Mauritius to the President of the Council.

7. The first speaker is the representative of Kuwait. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

8. Mr. ABULHASSAN (Kuwait) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like at the outset, Sir, to convey to you our congratulations on your assumption of the lofty position of President of the Council for this month. We are confident that your wise and able leadership will be an asset to the Council in its work.

9. I should also like to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, who demonstrated remarkable qualities during her presidency of the Council in the month of April.

10. Kuwait attaches great importance to the current debate on the situation in Namibia. Regrettably, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait was unable to participate in person in these proceedings and he entrusted me with the important task of representing him and supporting the joint action undertaken by his African and non-aligned colleagues especially mandated by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983 [*see S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2*].

11. Following the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris from 25 to 29 April 1983, the deliberations of the Council on the situation in Namibia are yet another instance where the international community is emphasizing its quest for peace and justice for the Namibian people, which has suffered for too long from military occupation, political suppression and economic exploitation. It is a quest for justice for a people which has repeatedly been denied the opportunity to enjoy prospects of freedom and self-determination. It is a quest that we, with anguish, compare to the quest for peace, justice and self-determination for the Palestinian people, who have shared the same plight and suffered similar conditions.

12. By these deliberations the international community is once again demonstrating its deep concern about the fate of decisions taken by this body and the erosion of a commitment undertaken unanimously five years ago by members of the Council, which then comprised the five members of the contact group. It would be exceedingly dangerous if the Council were diverted from fulfilment of its primary responsibility to ensure full implementation of its resolution 435 (1978). It is the sacred duty of the Council to reaffirm its resolve to seek a just solution of the Namibian problem based on resolution 435 (1978). That resolution, in the view of Kuwait, remains the basis for a peaceful settlement. Any deviation from its provisions and those of other relevant United Nations resolutions would be at the expense and to the detriment of the Namibian people.

13. We share the Secretary-General's profound concern, expressed in his latest report, at the possibility that "factors which lie outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978) should hamper its implementation" [*S/15776, para. 19*]. We refer, in particular, to the United States attempt to establish a linkage between Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. In general, especially after listening to the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom [*2439th meeting*], we are referring to the fact that the other members, with the exception of France, have not been forthright in denouncing that policy, which in our view undermines the efforts to ensure implementation of the United Nations plan according to resolution 435 (1978). This can only be regarded as encouraging South Africa in pursuing its delaying tactics with regard to a negotiated settlement. Furthermore, that policy denies a sovereign State, Angola, its inherent right to adopt measures to strengthen its security. We therefore reject that policy of linkage. We must not fail to commend France, a member of the contact group, for dissociating itself from that policy, as it confirmed recently at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence.[1] We believe that such a constructive position helps to emphasize the basic issue and facilitates the negotiating process, instead of injecting extraneous matters.

14. The five Western countries took upon themselves the responsibility for pursuing efforts to ensure implementation of resolution 435 (1978). While reaffirming the primary responsibility of the United Nations, and in particular the responsibility of the Council, to bring about the implementation of the independence plan for Namibia, we cannot but emphasize the role of the contact group in making this a reality. We have been assured by one member, the United Kingdom, that they intend to persevere and to succeed. We can only hope that they will take meaningful action in the fulfilment of their self-appointed role.

15. So far, the situation has been disheartening; it remains a source of comfort only to South Africa. The *apartheid* régime continues to thrive in a situation free of pressure. It has been assured repeatedly that the international community will not collectively apply any real sanctions. As recently as the beginning of this debate, we heard with dismay that sanctions would not reinforce the negotiation process, and we have the United States Administration advocating a policy of so-called constructive engagement. That policy constitutes an obstacle and only reinforces a régime bent on imposing its will on the international community. We had a demonstration of that only yesterday. That régime is bent on imposing its own interpretation of the settlement plan. It has indicated its idea of the form of government Namibia should have. It has been indicated as well what allies and what political régimes the neighbouring States should have.

16. The sacrifices made by the front-line States at a time when they have been the victims of direct military aggression, political intervention and economic destabilization have been staggering.

17. South Africa's persistence in pursuing these policies against the front-line States was demonstrated recently by its act of aggression against Mozambique. Kuwait condemns that wanton aggression, which is yet another manifestation of the animosity of the Pretoria régime against independent African States. Pretoria's apparent willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement will be viewed with suspicion as long as it persists in following a militaristic policy.

18. We believe that one way of strengthening the negotiating process is to bring pressure to bear on the intransigent party. Such action is not beyond the skill of the members of the Council, especially those directly concerned with that process. We have noted with satisfaction the efforts of the Scandinavian countries and the success their initiative has brought about in the field of investment. Kuwait is co-operating with other States in imposing sanctions and enforcing the oil embargo against South Africa. Kuwait observes and supports comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the Pretoria régime, and we will not hesitate to co-operate with others in the search for effective means of bringing pressure to bear on South Africa.

19. We have seen a liberation movement resolutely avoiding the military option in order to contribute to the success of the negotiating process. SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, has borne with patience all the tactics aimed at obstructing a negotiated settlement. We call upon the Western States to demonstrate their good will by adopting a pragmatic position. The current deliberations of the Council constitute an opportunity for those countries to reinforce not merely their commitment to a negotiating process, not merely the effectiveness of the Council, but their own credibility in professing their objective—and may that objective be a free and independent Namibia.

20. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Benin, Mr. Tiamiou Adjibade. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

21. Mr. ADJIBADE (Benin) (*interpretation from French*): We are happy to convey to you, Mr. President, our great satisfaction at seeing you occupying the position of President of this body in which, in the recent past, your brilliant eloquence was employed to denounce the injustices of our world.

22. Your experience, your great diplomatic talents, the high posts you have occupied in your great and beautiful country, Zaire, and particularly your quality as an African all represent valuable assets in conducting successfully the work of the Council at such a crucial time, when it is debating once again the disturbing question of Namibia.

23. We should like, above all, to express to the Secretary-General our great appreciation for the clarity and impartiality of his comments and the relevance and courage of the conclusions he reaches in his report on the question of Namibia [*S/15776*]. If we may be permitted to express a hope, it is that the important contribution of the Secretary-General will inspire the Council to conduct constructive discussions which will lead to the immediate and effective exercise by the oppressed Namibian people of their inalienable right.

24. Finally, we should like to express our pleasure at the presence among us in this chamber of that great freedom fighter, our brother Sam Nujoma. The important statement that he made before the Council [*2439th meeting*], with his characteristic judiciousness, is significant and instructive. His determination and vigilance, together with the selflessness of the fighting people of Namibia, constitute the surest guarantee of the success of the arduous struggle being waged so heroically by SWAPO.

25. Once again defying the international community, at the precise moment when this new debate on Namibia, this indictment of the crimes and abominations so cynically perpetrated by South Africa, is taking place, the Pretoria Fascists are once again demonstrating their passion for destabilization and aggression by unleashing their murderous hordes of outlaws against the peaceful people of Mozambique.

26. Although the feeling of the international community on the question of Namibia is unanimous—that is to say, that the Namibian people, like the other colonized peoples of yester-year, should be allowed to exercise freely their lawful right to self-determination and independence—we fear that these deliberations may once again serve merely as an opportunity for proclamations of good faith behind which are concealed the hypocrisy and cold calculations of those who in the past have encouraged, and continue to encourage, the procrastinators of Pretoria to persist in their outrageous defiance of the international community.

27. Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, terminating South Africa's Mandate over Namibia, the Organization has constantly sought and proposed solutions designed to restore to the Namibian people their inalienable rights. However, today, in 1983, nothing has changed; the Namibian people are still oppressed and deprived of their elementary rights and have imposed upon them the most atrocious foreign domination of the present era.

28. This disquieting fact prompts us to ask more than one tragic question. How many meetings, conferences, talks, symposiums, seminars or other such things must we hold on this question before the relevant resolutions of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations itself begin to be put into effect?

29. How many crimes, murders and acts of barbarism, how many acts of aggression and oppression, how much perfidy, how much treachery and how many delaying tactics by the inveterate racists of Pretoria must still be tolerated before an end is finally put to the martyrdom of the Namibian people?

30. What acts of courage, bravery, heroism and selflessness must we still expect from the valiant fighters of SWAPO before the women and children, the elderly and the men of Namibia cease to be pariahs in the land of their ancestors?

31. How much time, how many months or years, must we still wait before the Namibian people are finally able to exercise their sacred right to self-determination, sovereignty, independence and freedom?

32. The Pretoria Fascists are dreaming wild dreams. In their obstinacy they are aiming essentially at blunting the determination of the SWAPO fighters and persuading the international community to bow to their attempts to impose an internal settlement, which, as everyone knows, would amount to the installation of puppets, traitors and other groups in the pay of neo-colonial and racist interests.

33. The International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris from 25 to 29 April 1983, should—in case that should still have been necessary—have dashed these mad dreams.

34. Indeed, in the Paris Declaration on Namibia,[2] the Conference, solemnly proclaiming its unreserved support for the struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, condemned the intensification of barbarous repression, the policy of bantustanization and the efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia.

35. It condemned the ruthless exploitation of the Namibian people, the shameless plundering of their resources, the militarization of their territory and its use as a base for carrying out acts of aggression against the front-line States, particularly Angola, Zambia and Mozambique, as crimes that have created an extremely dangerous situation in southern Africa, threatening international peace and security.

36. It also denounced all attempts to link the question of Namibia with external problems which have no connection with it, such as the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.

37. Above all, the Conference reaffirmed its attachment to the United Nations plan for Namibia approved in resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), which the Council had laid down as the basis for a peaceful settlement which would be universally accepted.

38. Resolution 435 (1978), formulated and negotiated with the assistance of all parties concerned, appeared to be a compromise capable of winning the support of all parties. Unfortunately, although South Africa had been consulted and had given its consent at all stages of negotiation of the settlement plan approved in resolution 435 (1978), it continues illegally to occupy Namibian territory, five years after the adoption of that resolution by the Council, thus persisting in its defiance of the Organization.

39. This unacceptable defiance and arrogance on the part of a régime which has been outlawed by the international community gives rise to doubt as to the capacity of the Organization to translate into actions and deeds its own unanimously accepted decisions. The persistent defiance and arrogance of South Africa not only are an insult to the whole international community but also reflect above all the inability of the Council, and more particularly the weakened political will of the great Powers, to intervene promptly and effectively when peace, stability and international security are seriously threatened.

40. No matter how profound and incurable its political blindness may be, no matter how impressive may be its military arsenal of oppression, South Africa would not persist in its defiant attitude if it were not assured of the culpable benevolence of certain allied Powers.

41. When one considers the vehemence with which certain States condemn that which, in other circumstances and in their view, constitutes action prejudicial to human rights, one can only wonder about the justification of their attitude towards a régime which has elevated to a system of government the denial of the most elementary human rights. One can only be indignant at the misuse of the right of veto in the Council to oppose the adoption of concrete political and economic measures to compel South Africa to withdraw from Namibian territory and spare Namibia the horrors of abominable, inhuman racial discrimination.

42. Given all the precautions which the members of the contact group have contrived to adopt in order to accom-

modate South Africa in their actions designed to prevail upon it to take part in the implementation of the settlement plan, with the formulation of which it was associated and to which it had given its consent, we can only be even more fully convinced that South Africa is just one link in a vast and complex process of exploitation in which the Powers which make up the contact group participate—by means of their firms and their international and multinational corporations. We can thus understand the hesitation or the refusal to exert real, decisive pressure on South Africa.

43. It is easy to realize, in consequence, that the true nature of the struggle being waged by the Namibian people is essentially anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-racist.

44. The results of five years of effort by the contact group—which we should like to commend—prompt one to think that the optimism-to-order displayed by the Member States concerned and the publicity accompanying each of their actions are nothing but a smoke-screen to camouflage the delaying tactics aimed at imposing a neo-colonial solution on Namibia in order to safeguard selfish political, economic and military interests, sacrificing the rights of the Namibian people in an attempt to obtain recognition, at the international level, for the puppets who, in such a docile and shameful manner, serve the interests of Pretoria.

45. Again, one cannot but believe that, in endorsing the South African demand for granting constitutional guarantees to the white minority in Namibia, the member States of the contact group have actually given their blessing by so doing to a racist policy which wishes to see the whites continuing to enjoy privileges that are denied to the blacks.

46. Only recently, in deciding to grant a credit of one billion of special drawing rights to South Africa, against the will of the international community as clearly expressed in General Assembly resolution 37/2 of 21 October 1982, the International Monetary Fund, dominated as the Council knows, simply made a direct and substantial contribution to the strengthening of the arsenal of repression, oppression and aggression of the neo-Nazis of Pretoria. That decision of the Fund is in itself a defiance of the relevant United Nations resolutions and of international morality; it is also an offence to the conscience of the world, because it is an encouragement of the crime of *apartheid*, an encouragement of a crime against humanity.

47. In sharing with the Council this distressing record on Namibia, the first conclusion to which we are ineluctably driven is the crushing defeat of South Africa in its diabolical designs, despite the size of its resources and the scope of the crimes to which it has resorted. South Africa has been categorically repudiated by the valiant Namibian people, and the puppet régime which it has attempted to impose disappeared into thin air at the beginning of this year. South Africa keeps going thanks to an armed dictatorship which, supported from outside and guaranteed impunity, is extending its aggression and occupation of the territory of others to neighbouring countries, particularly Angola, Mozambique and Zambia.

48. Another fact, no less significant when one looks at the record of the Namibian situation, relates to the result of the action undertaken by the contact group, which volunteered its assistance to bring about a peaceful settlement. In spite of its good intentions so often affirmed, and which we appreciate, the contact group has not been able, over the last five years, to discharge the task which it set itself very willingly. The only net result of the work of those five years seems to be that the contact group has helped South Africa to gain time to consolidate its entrenchment and to exploit the vast riches of Namibian territory more successfully.

49. Fettered by its own contradictory interests, the contact group has rather become a brake on the process of Namibian independence, which is and must remain the final goal. That is not an accusation but a simple statement of fact, and we hope that our friends, the members of the contact group, will understand us properly. In the course of five years of effort, the contribution of the contact group to the settlement of the Namibian problem is unfortunately far from that hoped for. This is affirmed by SWAPO and our own country, Benin.

50. Five years in the life of an oppressed people struggling for its freedom and independence is a great deal, and it is too much. The good will of the individual members of the contact group will determine whether, in spite of everything, we shall place our continued, albeit eroded, confidence in that group.

51. It is for the Council to take a calm decision. Our analysis may seem simplistic to some, but we earnestly hope that the members of the contact group themselves will prove us wrong in our assessment by implementing, before December 1983, the provisions of resolution 435 (1978).

52. Be that as it may, it is up to those members of the group that do not always share certain of its approaches, or have felt it necessary, like France, to dissociate themselves publicly from certain manoeuvres, to lead the way for the members that wish only a neo-colonial type of independence for Namibia, or are striving to link Namibian independence to extraneous issues.

53. To link the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the process of the decolonization of Namibia is tantamount not only to meddling in affairs that concern two sovereign States, but also to facilitating and indemnifying crimes daily committed by the soldiery of South Africa against the independent States and peoples of that region. It is also an attempt to rob the Namibian problem of its true dimensions, that is to say, as a manifestation of colonial domination and a violation of the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations as well as of the decisions and resolutions of the Organization.

54. We should like, however, to stress publicly, with appreciation, as we have not ceased to do in private, the positive individual acts of certain members of the contact group—to wit, the Federal Republic of Germany and France—acts that might have contributed decisively to a solution of the problem before us if those contact group members had not been thwarted in their efforts by the solidarity which the group is supposed to observe among its members. We urge those countries to pursue their efforts, even outside the contact group, and we hope that their good intentions *vis-à-vis* the Namibian problem will soon bear fruit and thus demonstrate that the confidence reposed in them has not been in vain.

55. The tragedy of Namibia is not just the illegal occupation of a Territory; it is not just the denial of the most basic rights of a people; it is not just *apartheid* and racism; it is the unabashed exploitation of a people, the ruthless plundering of its resources, and this in defiance of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted on 27 September 1974 by the United Nations Council for Namibia.[1]

56. The rate at which these corporations are plundering the country will inevitably lead, in the final analysis, to the exhaustion of its resources—which cannot fail to have disastrous effects on the future economic life and viability of an independent Namibia. There is every reason to believe that they wish first of all to exhaust the significant natural resources of Namibia before permitting it to accede to independence, in order to place in a difficult situation any authentic future administration of that country, which will thus be forced into economic dependence upon South Africa.

57. It is high time to put an end to this vast conspiracy. It is time to put an end to the enslavement and exploitation of the Namibian people. The international community can no longer tolerate the arrogance and the constant defiance of the two black sheep of the Organization, Israel and South Africa, the numerous misdeeds of whose unholy alliance have too long gone unpunished.

58. It is therefore left to the Council, strong in its prerogatives, to adopt whatever firm and effective measures are necessary to further the Namibian cause and to guarantee the long-suffering Namibian people the immediate exercise of their inalienable rights. In this regard, the conclusions of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence,[2] the report of the Secretary-General [*ibid.*] and the important statement of the President of SWAPO, our brother Sam Nujoma [***2439th meeting***], are all documents of the highest importance, which should inspire and guide the members of the Council in their deliberations, whose importance for the non-aligned countries requires no further demonstration.

59. The Council must, *inter alia*, reaffirm the relevance of all the resolutions of the Organization on this question, resolutions confirming the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence, affirming the integrity of their Territory, including Walvis Bay and the other islands off the Namibian coast, and condemning the *apartheid* régime for its crimes and its shameless exploitation of the resources of the Namibian people.

60. The Council must categorically reject all attempts to establish a link or a parallel between the independence of Namibia and problems which have nothing to do with that issue, in particular, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

61. The Council must, above all, revitalize the United Nations plan approved in resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), adopted unanimously by the Council, by requiring that it be implemented immediately without any restriction, modification, or escape clause. In other words, the Council must create the necessary conditions to make the independence of Namibia the reality of realities before December 1983.

62. What is happening in Namibia is not just a flagrant and persistent violation of international law; it is also a crime against humanity and a permanent denial of the dignity and identity of man.

63. The time has come, therefore, for the Council to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

64. The Benin delegation, for its part, wishes to reaffirm its position of principle of total support for the just struggle of the Namibian people and to congratulate the United Nations Council for Namibia, which, under the leadership of its President, Mr. Paul Lusaka of Zambia, is sparing no effort to discharge its responsibilities as the legal Administering Authority of Namibia until independence.

65. To all oppressed peoples fighting for independence, freedom, national unity and territorial integrity—particularly the Palestinian people, the Sahrawi people, the people of Cyprus and the people of Timor fighting for the liberation of their territories from the grip of the colonizing invader of the twentieth century—the revolutionary people of Benin will never cease to offer their active support and solidarity in the most practical fashion in so far as they are able.

66. Our delegation wishes to pay a well-deserved tribute to the valiant peoples of the front-line States, particularly those of Zambia, Mozambique and, above all, Angola, for the tremendous sacrifices they have constantly made to thwart the repeated acts of aggression by Pretoria, which is using Namibian territory as a springboard for subversive and destabilizing operations against the other States of the region. Benin reaffirms its total solidarity with the front-line peoples, who enjoy the unreserved support of the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement.

67. The Benin delegation expresses the hope that, on this occasion, the Council will measure up to its respon-

sibilities and not disappoint the hopes that the international community and the people of Namibia have placed in it—hopes of seeing the valiant people of Namibia exercising freely and immediately their inalienable right to independence under the leadership of SWAPO.

68. It will depend on the Security Council whether the final, inevitable victory of the Namibian people will be that of the gun or the olive branch. Ready for the revolution, the struggle continues!

69. Mr. TINOCO FONSECA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Although my delegation has had an opportunity to congratulate Mr. Umba di Lutete on Zaire's assumption of the presidency of the Council, I should like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's pleasure at your excellent conduct of our discussions this month when there has been a great deal of hard work. This prompts us to believe that the entire international community, Africa and, in particular, the people of Namibia will in the course of this debate benefit greatly from your leadership.

70. We wish also to extend our best wishes to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the non-aligned countries who are taking part in this debate. We bid welcome in a spirit of solidarity to Comrade Sam Nujoma, President of heroic SWAPO, and are delighted to have him with us.

71. Five years after the adoption of resolution 435 (1978) and more than half a century after South African military forces entered the Territory, peace, freedom and independence for the people of Namibia are still goals that necessitate hard work.

72. We hope that this debate will be a starting-point in our efforts to achieve the goals that we have set ourselves, which are not only an aspiration of the people of Namibia but also an objective of the entire international community.

73. A sense of frustration has permeated the atmosphere owing to the impossibility of achieving substantive progress in the process of Namibia's independence; self-seeking forces are feverishly at work trying to maintain an intolerable *status quo* that benefits only those who with impunity exploit Namibia's wealth and profit from the fact that South Africa is a mercenary State.

74. The colonial occupation of Namibia is illegal from every point of view, according to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971[4] and the overwhelming verdict of the whole world.

75. It must be stressed that at this stage, 12 years after the advisory opinion of the Court was handed down, the scourge afflicting the people of Namibia has assumed intolerable proportions. Foreign interests and transnational corporations are relentlessly plundering the Territory's wealth and depriving the people of Namibia of their undeniable heritage, in open violation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia[3] and numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, all to the benefit of the South African régime, which is dramatically strengthening its hand and reaping many advantages as a result of its fruitful relations with those who are exploiting the wealth that belongs to the people of Namibia alone.

76. In spite of the laudable willingness of SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, to seek a peaceful solution of this colonial problem, day after day South Africa is raising more obstacles to this process of independence or altering its true nature. In the April issue of *Africa Now*, a report was published to the effect that South Africa is promoting an independence plan for Namibia that would involve the dismemberment of the Territory. According to that "independence plan", the northern part of the Territory, that is, the part bordering on Angola, would be given to the counter-revolutionary Angolan puppet, Jonas Savimbi, and, in keeping with Pretoria's calculations, that would make it possible for the whites in the remainder of the Territory to become the most numerous ethnic group and guarantee that they would retain power and be able to continue the well-known practices of *apartheid* and bantustanization, thus more easily extending their role as a United States-type policeman in southern Africa. The plan is abominable from every point of view and stands little chance of success, but it gives us a clear idea of the true intentions of Pretoria with regard to the decolonization of Namibia.

77. Nevertheless, we are absolutely convinced that South Africa's intransigence is neither spontaneous nor born of a feeling of independent self-sufficiency. Its irrational attitude is based on the unswerving support it receives from a permanent member of the Council, which does not hesitate to display its friendly attitude towards the racist Pretoria régime, with which it obviously shares certain values and aspirations.

78. It was the United States that, in 1981, when it appeared that significant progress was being made in the talks on Namibian independence, invented for South Africa the pretext of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and their withdrawal as a condition of the granting of independence to the Territory. South Africa has managed to make good use of this contribution by the United States, but the international community has vigorously and unambiguously rejected that manoeuvre, while SWAPO, with justice on its side, has taken appropriate action.

79. In January of this year at Harare in the presence of Chester Crocker, the United States representative at the negotiations, Comrade Sam Nujoma, the leader of SWAPO, stated:

> "The Reagan Administration introduced a collateral issue that has led to an impasse in the negotiations on Namibia over the past six months. Washington's insistence on linking Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola has provided South Africa with a convenient excuse for delay-

ing the implementation of the United Nations plan for independence."

80. One clear objective of the United States is to create obstacles and conditions that are unacceptable not only to the people of Namibia but also to the other members of the contact group. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Mr. Claude Cheysson, at the recent International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, openly criticized the attempt to link the two issues, and it is known that other Western countries do not accept that linkage. It would seem that the world has become polarized on this issue, with the United States and South Africa at one extreme and the international community at the other.

81. In its resolution 37/233 B of 20 December 1982, the General Assembly firmly rejected the persistent attempts by the United States and South Africa to establish any linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, a manoeuvre that is aimed solely at slowing down the decolonization process in Namibia and constitutes interference in the internal affairs of Angola.

82. That rejection was also reflected in the joint communiqué issued by the Government of Nicaragua and a mission of consultation of the United Nations Council for Namibia when the mission visited Managua on 21 and 22 April 1983.[5]

83. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in March this year at New Delhi, referred to the matter in the following terms:

> "In this connection, the Conference most categorically rejected the linkage or parallelism being drawn by the United States Administration between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This continued insistence constitutes an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of Angola." [*See S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 48.*]

More recently, the front-line States, in the communiqué issued following the meeting of heads of State or Government held at Dar es Salaam, on 12 May of this year, with reference to this already refuted argument,

> "reiterated their rejection of the United States policy according to which the independence of Namibia was subject to the withdrawal of Cuban forces fron Angola. They affirm that such insistence undermines efforts to implement the United Nations plan and thereby serves to perpetuate South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia."

84. We fully support the approach taken by the Secretary-General in his further report on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) on this subject. This is what he says:

> "Unfortunately . . . the positive side of the balance sheet has been set back by the emergence of other issues which were neither raised nor envisaged at the time when resolution 435 (1978) was adopted or in the subsequent negotiations under United Nations auspices. These issues now apparently constitute the main reason for the delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan. I am deeply concerned that factors which lie outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978) should hamper its implementation." [*S/15776, para. 19.*]

85. There is therefore an overwhelming international agreement with regard both to the unavowed intention behind that manoeuvre and to its inappropriateness. Nevertheless, its sponsors continue to persist with it.

86. This of course means that the United States now finds itself at odds with all of Africa. The entire continent has forged a monolithic and indestructible united front against South Africa and its abhorrent system of ***apartheid***, its policy of destabilization and aggression against the front-line States and its unlawful colonial occupation of Namibia. Yet the United States continues to stand by South Africa. Its position is particularly eloquent, a clear example of the parameters used to measure democracy and freedom by one that calls the criminal ex-Somozist guards "freedom fighters", and describes as "terrorists" the Namibians who are fighting to liberate their unlawfully occupied territory, a territory that has been plundered and whose people have been brutally repressed. Africa—like the Arab nation—must not lose sight of the fact that in this regard the choices of the United States have already been made: *apartheid* and Zionism, abominable creations spawned by the same empire.

87. We have recently been informed of the latest aggression by South Africa against Mozambique. We are deeply outraged and we unhesitatingly express our strong rejection of this action. That, then, is the kind of peace that is intended for southern Africa. Nicaragua requests the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mozambique to convey its sincere feelings of solidarity to the people and Government of Mozambique.

88. There is, however, an even greater danger. The development of South Africa's nuclear capability, which would be impossible without the transfer of technology by certain Powers, entails unimaginable risks of destruction and suffering, not only for southern Africa but for the whole of that continent. The newspaper *The Star*, of Johannesburg, in its issue dated 3 May, in an article entitled "South Africa able to produce 15 nuclear bombs", reports on the level of nuclear technology achieved by the Pretoria régime. I should like to read a brief excerpt from that article:

> "South Africa now has enough enriched uranium for 15 nuclear bombs and could have enough for 60 bombs by 1987. This point is made in a study of nuclear-weapons potential carried out by a major American newspaper chain recently and read into the

Congressional Record by Senator William Proxmire, a Democrat from Wisconsin. Senator Proxmire referred to the report as extraordinarily well documented and said it underlined the urgent need to stop the spread of nuclear weapons."*

89. We are quite sure that, if those Powers with strong economic, political and military links with South Africa were to exert constant pressure on that country, the possibilities of a solution to the colonial problem before us would become much greater. The attitude of SWAPO and its willingness to co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) greatly contribute to the only solution acceptable in this case, an independent Namibia with its territory intact, including Walvis Bay and the adjacent islands. Any attempt to fragment the Territory is quite unacceptable.

90. The decolonization of Namibia cannot be postponed. We should like to see a willingness on the part of all the permanent members of the Council to act in support of the people of Namibia and not against them. The disheartening veto of 1981 must be relinquished to history and buried. We must act decisively; the action should not be limited to the sacrifices and heroism of the Namibian people; it is a task for all of us and for the Council in particular.

91. The Secretary-General, with his customary common sense, prudence and insight, has informed us in his recent report:

> "It is evident that the delay in implementing resolution 435 (1978) is having a destructive impact not only on Namibia itself but also on the prospect of a peaceful and prosperous future for the region as a whole. The delay also has an adverse effect on international relations in a wider sphere, adding to the prevailing sense of frustration and mistrust, with all that that implies for peace and security in the region." [*Ibid., para. 16.*]

92. For that reason, the role of the Council on this occasion, in exercise of the mandate assigned to it by the international community, is important for two reasons. On the one hand, it must uphold the inalienable right of the people of Namibia through the implementation of resolution 435 (1978); and, on the other hand, it must ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, thereby putting an end to an intolerable and anachronistic situation which, if prolonged, could lead to an aggravation of the conflict. We cannot evade our obligation. Under General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations, but the attainment of its independence largely depends on our forthrightness and determination in facing this challenge.

93. The International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence appealed to us to take immediate action, and it did so in the following terms:

> "The Conference, therefore, calls upon the Security Council to meet at the earliest possible date to consider further action on the implementation of its plan for Namibia's independence, thereby assuming its primary responsibility for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Five years after the adoption of that resolution it is high time that the Security Council assumed fully the central role in its implementation and established the Council's own time-frame for such implementation."[6]

94. Whereas the contact group has been unable in five years to carry out the tasks it assumed and whereas the outlook is rather gloomy in this area, the Secretary-General, in the opinion of my delegation, is in a position to play a decisive role in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Nicaragua would support such a wise assignment, which could only further the process of independence and thereby benefit the people of Namibia.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

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* Quoted in English by the speaker.

NOTES

[1] *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part one, para. 31.

[2] *Ibid.*, part three, paras. 166-195.

[3] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24*, vol. I, annex II.

[4] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

[5] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 24*, para. 879, sect. 2(*d*).

[6] *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part three, para. 193.